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INTRODUCTION
Administrative law plays a key role in mediating the
allocation of power among the branches of government.
Between the executive and judicial branches, administrative
law governs how courts can review agency decisions, and
what rules apply to that review.1 These principles involve the
oft-discussed questions of standards of review and deference
to agency decisions, including the widely studied Chevron
1. See STEVEN G. BREYER, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY xxxix (6th ed. 2006).
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doctrine. Much less discussed, though equally important in
mediating the allocation of power, is the Chenery doctrine.
This doctrine provides that a court reviewing an agency
action may only affirm that action on the grounds articulated
by the agency when it made its decision.2
In imposing this limit on judicial review, Chenery
protects the proper separation of powers between branches of
the federal government.3 In particular, Chenery protects the
authority delegated to agencies by Congress from usurpation
by the courts. By denying courts the ability to substitute
their own decisionmaking process for an agency’s, it keeps
power within those institutions most competent to exercise it.
But in spite of its place as a “ ‘fundamental’ and ‘bedrock’ ”
principle of administrative law,4 relatively little scholarship
has analyzed exactly how courts apply Chenery in practice.5
This dearth in scholarship may be partly attributable to a
basic premise of administrative law—that there are
fundamental principles, like the Chenery doctrine, relating to
agency action and judicial review thereof that are
2. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943). SEC v.
Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947), is also associated with another
doctrine of administrative law—that agencies have discretion over the
procedural form of their actions. See Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 203; M. Elizabeth
Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004).
3. See Harold J. Krent, Ancillary Issues Concerning Agency Explanations,
in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 197, 197
(John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005); Richard E. Levy & Robert L.
Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499, 504 (2011).
4. Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE
L.J. 952, 955 (2007) (quoting from Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196 and Konan v.
Att’y Gen. of the United States, 432 F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir. 2005)).
5. The few pieces of scholarship focusing on Chenery include a 1969 article
by Judge Henry J. Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and
Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969 DUKE L.J. 199 (1969), Kevin M. Stack’s
The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, supra note 4, a student note
proposing a relaxation of the Chenery doctrine, Note, Rationalizing Hard Look
Review After the Fact, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1909 (2009), and two pieces looking at
Chenery’s application in specific substantive areas: Bryan C. Bond, Note,
Taking It on the Chenery: Should the Principles of Chenery I Apply in Social
Security Disability Cases?, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2157 (2011); Matthew
Ginsburg, “A Nigh Endless Game of Battledore and Shuttlecock”: The D.C.
Circuit’s Misuse of Chenery Remands in NLRB Cases, 86 NEB. L. REV. 595
(2008). Sapna Kumar has also more briefly addressed the Federal Circuit’s
application of Chenery in part III.C. of her recent article, The Accidental
Agency?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 229, 267–74 (2013), in arguing that the Federal Circuit
acts more like an agency than a court.
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transsubstantive, applying in the same way to widely
divergent areas of law.6 In practice, however, the effect and
application of administrative principles such as Chenery can
differ substantially across agencies, areas of law, and courts.7
As a consequence, attempts to reach a fundamental
understanding of the Chenery doctrine can be hindered—or at
least confused—by the broad range of ways in which the
doctrine is actually applied by different courts and in
different substantive areas.
In this Article, I seek to better understand the Chenery
doctrine with a case study: its application to Federal Circuit
review of U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) decisions
to reject patent applications. While there is a growing body of
scholarship examining the relationship between patent and
administrative law, it has focused on standards of review,
largely leaving Chenery out of the picture.8 Despite the focus
on standards of review, scholars have noted that these
standards have more symbolic than practical importance in
patent cases, rarely affecting the outcomes.9 In contrast,
whether and how courts apply Chenery has real, tangible
effects on judicial review. This Article is an effort to rethink
Chenery’s on-the-ground mechanics and its implications for
6. See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 3, at 499 & n.1 (describing this basic
premise and stating that it “certainly holds true for iconic administrative law
decisions like Chenery”).
7. See id. at 499–500 (“[J]udicial precedents tend to rely most heavily on
other cases involving the agency under review, even for generally applicable
administrative law principles. As the courts repeated the verbal formulations
or doctrinal approaches reflected in those cases, both the articulation and
application of the doctrine often began over time to develop their own unique
characteristics within the precedents concerning the specific agency. In some
cases, these formulations deviated significantly from the conventional
understanding of the relevant principles as a matter of ‘administrative law.’ ”).
8. The exception is the recent article by Professor Kumar, supra note 5, at
267–74.
9. Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1978 (2009) (“Orin Kerr has called Zurko’s pondering of the
level of deference to give to the PTO’s factual findings ‘a question with more
symbolic than practical importance,’ the results of which are not ‘likely to have
a significant impact on the functioning of the patent system.’ . . . [T]he number
of cases affected by the difference is small—as the Supreme Court in Zurko
itself noted, the functional difference between an ‘unsupported by substantial
evidence’ standard and a ‘clearly erroneous’ standard is vanishingly small . . . .”
(citing Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 127, 168 (2000))).
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the allocation of power between agencies and courts, as a
matter of administrative law generally, and more specifically
between the Federal Circuit and the PTO. By undertaking
this study, this Article also addresses an important but yet
relatively unexplored aspect of how administrative law is
translated (and sometimes mistranslated) into the realm of
patent law.
Three factors combine to make appeals from the PTO an
especially interesting area for examining the scope and
application of Chenery. First, the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Federal Circuit over appeals of patent application denials by
the PTO10 creates a uniform framework to study the
doctrine’s application. Second, the Federal Circuit has taken
a more aggressive stance on Chenery than most other courts,
holding that it applies to fewer types of agency decisions, thus
limiting judicial review in fewer circumstances.11 This view of
Chenery is consistent with other instances of Federal Circuit
exceptionalism in administrative law as applied to the PTO,
which result in the Federal Circuit often according the PTO
less deference than most other agencies are accorded.12 This
more limited view of Chenery, combined with the complicated
doctrinal structure of patent law, reveals ambiguities in the
doctrine. Third, the more limited authority of the PTO as
compared to other agencies highlights the Chenery doctrine’s
role in mediating the balance of power between agencies and
courts. Thus, a focused inquiry into Chenery’s application in
patent law ultimately leads to insights about the power
relationship between the Federal Circuit and the PTO, as
well as about the fundamental meaning and effects of
Chenery that are applicable to administrative law more
generally.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the origins
of the Chenery doctrine and its doctrinal evolution. Part II
explores specific instances in which the Federal Circuit has
discussed Chenery in appeals from PTO decisions. I highlight
several inconsistencies and ambiguities in the application of
10. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (West 2012).
11. See infra Part II.C.
12. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA?
What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269,
284–308 (2007).
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Chenery. If the doctrine’s application is unpredictable—as I
argue it is—that is troubling because the unpredictability
undermines Chenery’s purpose of ensuring the appropriate
separation of powers between the judicial and executive
branches when courts review agency action. In particular,
uncertainty about when Chenery applies gives a court greater
control over whether it will defer to agency reasoning or
whether it will instead substitute its own. The consequence
is a significant danger of court encroachment on
congressionally delegated agency power. While this concern
applies across administrative law, it is particularly acute in
the context of the Federal Circuit’s review of PTO decisions,
where there is significant evidence of Federal Circuit
resistance to granting the agency deference. Part III draws
lessons from this case study for both patent appeals and the
role of Chenery more generally. I discuss a range of ways to
rethink Chenery, focusing on how the doctrine can be made
more predictable while having an appropriate scope. I
ultimately propose a better Chenery doctrine for patent law
based on the doctrine’s costs and benefits, and on
fundamental separation of powers considerations.
This
rethought Chenery doctrine reflects a more cogent approach
to the relationship between the decisions by administrative
agencies and the courts.
I.

THE CHENERY DOCTRINE

A. The General Principle
In reviewing a lower court decision, an appellate court
will generally affirm the lower court’s judgment on any
ground established by the record, regardless of whether the
lower court relied on that ground.13 But when a court reviews
an administrative decision, SEC v. Chenery Corporation
provides that “an administrative order cannot be upheld
unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising
its powers were those upon which its action can be

13. See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937) (“In the review of
judicial proceedings the rule is settled that if the decision below is correct, it
must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave
a wrong reason.”).
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sustained.”14 The decision must be judged based on the
grounds relied upon in the record—not on post hoc
justifications—and the court cannot substitute its own
rationale for the decision.15
SEC v. Chenery Corporation (Chenery I) arose out of the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) duty under the
Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) of 1935 to
During
reorganize public utility holding companies.16
reorganization of the Federal Water Service Corporation, the
SEC concluded that the corporation’s directors, officers, and
controlling stockholders could not purchase preferred stock.17
The SEC’s rationale was that such purchases would violate
the established fiduciary duties of the directors, officers, and
controlling stockholders.18 The corporation challenged this
decision. When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Court held that established judicial precedents did not dictate
that their fiduciary duties precluded the purchases.19 The
Court reversed the SEC’s decision and remanded to the
agency.20 The Court suggested that the SEC could have
prohibited the purchase arrangement under PUHCA, but it
held that because the SEC’s decision was based on an
incorrect interpretation of the judicial precedent on fiduciary
duties, the Court could not affirm it. Instead, the Court could
affirm only on a rationale articulated by the agency.21
On remand, the SEC said once again that the purchases
were prohibited.22 This time, though, it based its decision on
a different ground: two sections of PUCHA disallowed the
purchases.23 When the case again reached the Supreme
Court in Chenery II, the Court affirmed based on the new

14. Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943).
15. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973); Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971); Burlington Truck Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168–69 (1962); Krent, supra note 3, at 197;
Stack, supra note 4, at 956.
16. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 81–85.
17. Id. at 85.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 88–89.
20. Id. at 95.
21. Id. at 87–88.
22. Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 199 (1947).
23. See id.
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rationale.24 In doing so, the Court reiterated the lesson of
Chenery I—that a court, when reviewing agency action, must
base its review on a ground actually invoked by the agency.
The reviewing court may not substitute what it considers a
more adequate or proper basis for the agency action, because
doing so would intrude on the domain of exclusive agency
authority created by Congress.25
B. Subsequent Development and Divergence in the Doctrine
After Chenery, a series of cases modified the scope of the
doctrine, with some variation between appellate courts. In
some ways, the case law expanded the doctrine’s scope,
applying it to a broad range of administrative
decisionmaking. In other ways, the case law limited the
doctrine’s scope by introducing several exceptions to the
general rule. These developments—particularly in a handful
of courts, including the Federal Circuit—have cast doubt on
the coherence and predictability of the Chenery doctrine.
1. A Framework for Analysis
Before turning to these changes, understanding how
Chenery has evolved requires a brief overview of the
framework for judicial review of agency actions. Judicial
review of agency actions can be understood as having two
relevant axes that determine the form of review. First, the
form of review depends on the mode in which the action was
carried out—how formal was the proceeding? Proceedings
fall into four categories—informal adjudication, informal
rulemaking (called notice-and-comment rulemaking), formal
adjudication, and formal rulemaking. Second, the form of
judicial review depends on the type of agency action—is it a
finding of fact, a determination of law, or an exercise of
24. Id. at 209.
25. Id. at 196 (“When the case was first here, we emphasized a simple but
fundamental rule of administrative law. That rule is to the effect that a
reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an
administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of
such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds are
inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative
action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis.
To do so would propel the court into the domain which Congress has set aside
exclusively for the administrative agency.”).
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judgment or discretion?26
For each combination of mode and type of agency action,
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or case law sets out
a default standard of review that applies when a court
reviews an agency’s action, absent alternative statutory
provisions.27 The standard of review determines with how
much deference a court will scrutinize an agency’s action.28
These standards of review are often seen as the heart of
administrative law.
But they do not capture another
important dimension of judicial review—what will a
reviewing court examine in deciding whether the standard of
review is met? The Chenery doctrine addresses this missing
dimension. When Chenery applies, judicial review is limited
to the agency’s own explanation.29

26. Introduction to the Chapters on the Scope of Judicial Review, in A GUIDE
POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES, supra note 3, at 51,

TO JUDICIAL AND

51.

27. Id. For instance, a finding of fact by an agency during a formal
adjudication or rulemaking would generally be reviewed under the “substantial
evidence” standard, as dictated by the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006). On the
other hand, during an informal adjudication or notice-and-comment
rulemaking, a finding of fact would generally be reviewed under the “arbitrary
and capricious” standard, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 414 (1971), and the same standard of review applies to agency policy
decisions and exercises of discretion. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). Questions
of law also receive varying levels of deference depending on the type of
proceeding, as well as on the type of legal question. For agency interpretations
of an unclear statute, the default deference is Skidmore deference. Benjamin &
Rai, supra note 12, at 295. Skidmore deference gives an agency’s decision
weight based on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944). However, if Congress has “delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and . . . the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority,” the agency interpretation of an unclear statute receives greater
Chevron deference, United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001),
which is described in Part III.B.2. When an agency interprets its own
regulation, it receives Auer deference, which gives the agency interpretation
“controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.” Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
28. See generally BREYER, supra note 1, at 191.
29. See Stack, supra note 4, at 971–72.
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2. Modes of Decisionmaking: Rulemaking or
Adjudication, Formal or Informal?
Keeping in mind this framework for judicial review of
agency action, we can now turn back to the post-Chenery case
law. The Chenery case itself involved review of an agency
decision made through formal adjudication.30 Immediately
after the Court’s Chenery decisions, it was unclear whether
the principle would apply to other modes of agency
decisionmaking.31 Because the Chenery decision articulated
the significance of the record for judicial review, it might have
been expected that the Supreme Court would restrict its
application
to
formal,
on-the-record
administrative
proceedings.32 Despite this initial uncertainty, subsequent
cases gradually expanded Chenery’s application to informal
agency decisionmaking.33 In the early 1970s, the Supreme
Court applied the Chenery principle to informal
adjudications,34 and in 1983, it first applied the principle to
Thus, the Chenery
notice-and-comment rulemaking.35
principle is now treated as a general rule of judicial review,
applying to all modes of agency decisionmaking.36
3. Types of Decisionmaking: Policy, Fact, and Law
With respect to the type of agency decisionmaking
(policy, fact, or law), it is less clear when Chenery applies. In
the Chenery case itself, the agency based its decision on an
30. Id. at 962. Although Chenery I was decided before the APA was
enacted, the procedure followed by the SEC fell within what would become the
APA’s definition of formal adjudication. Id. at 962 n.29.
31. Id. at 962.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 138 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 417, 419–20 (1971); see Stack, supra note 4, at
962.
35. See Stack, supra note 4, at 962–63 (discussing and citing cases applying
Chenery to notice-and-comment rulemaking).
36. See id. at 956, 962 (“The principle now applies in review of every form of
agency action, from agency rulemaking to informal adjudication, as well as in
review of all manner of deficiencies in agency fact-finding and insufficient
statements of reasons, not merely to agency reliance on legally erroneous
grounds.” Id. at 956. “[T]he Supreme Court has extended the demand for
explicit reason-giving to virtually every form of agency action and every
conceivable type of deficiency in an agency’s stated justification for its action.”
Id. at 962.).
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erroneous legal conclusion—an incorrect interpretation of
fiduciary duties.37 Yet, the jurisprudence regarding Chenery
seems to have gone in the opposite direction. Courts and
scholars agree that Chenery applies to findings of fact and
exercises of judgment or discretion, but they disagree on
whether and to what extent it applies to questions of law.
Although most courts apply Chenery to questions of law,38
some courts and scholars have concluded that Chenery does
not apply to questions of law.39

37. Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 88–89 (1943); Stack, supra note 4, at 956.
38. Cf. Stack, supra note 4, at 965–66, 1008 (discussing the scope and
limitations of Chenery’s application).
39. See, e.g., HealthEast Bethesda Lutheran Hosp. & Rehabilitation Ctr. v.
Shalala, 164 F.3d 415, 418 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he Court also explicitly limited
[the Chenery] ruling to cases in which an agency fails to make a necessary
determination of fact or policy.”); Ark. AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1440 (8th
Cir. 1993) (“[T]he Supreme Court clearly limited Chenery to situations in which
the agency failed to make a necessary determination of fact or of policy.”); Ry.
Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 784 F.2d 959, 969 (9th Cir.
1986) (“Generally, a reviewing court may only judge the propriety of an agency
decision on the grounds invoked by the agency. However, the court is not so
bound when, as here, the issue in dispute is the interpretation of a federal
statute.” (citation omitted)); N.C. Comm’n of Indian Affairs v. U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, 725 F.2d 238, 240 (4th Cir. 1984) (“We do not, however, perceive there to
be a Chenery problem in the instant case because the question of interpretation
of a federal statute is not ‘a determination or judgment which an administrative
agency alone is authorized to make.’ ” (quoting Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 196
(1947))); Milk Transport, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 190 F. Supp.
350, 354–55 (D. Minn, 1960) (“The first Chenery case did hold that a reviewing
court must judge an agency order only on the grounds on which the order was
based, but the court limited this rule to determinations which the
administrative agency alone is authorized to make. . . . We are interpreting the
scope of a federal statute and this task is not peculiar to an administrative
agency.”); Krent, supra note 3, at 204 (“[T]he Chenery doctrine applies to the
policy and factual bases that support an agency action . . . .”); Patrick J. Glen,
“To Remand, or Not to Remand”: Ventura’s Ordinary Remand Rule and the
Evolving Jurisprudence of Futility, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 1, 2 (2010)
(stating that with the Chenery decision, “the Court gave voice to what would
become the courts’ deferential stance to agency factual findings and
discretionary determinations, and its continuing authority to review legal and
constitutional claims de novo”). Professor Stack cites some courts as taking this
approach, but he argues that it is an implausible position, at least when
Chevron deference applies. Stack, supra note 4 at 1008–10 (“Some courts have
concluded that the Chenery principle applies only to lapses in agency factfinding
or policymaking rationales but does not extend to an agency’s failure to
articulate the basis for its interpretation of statutes that the agency
administers. Regardless of whether that was a plausible position prior to
Chevron, it does not make sense once Chevron is in the picture.” Id. at 1008.).
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This divergence of views seems to originate from three
statements by the Supreme Court in the original Chenery
cases. In Chenery I, the Court stated that a court cannot
intrude into an agency’s domain “[i]f an order is valid only as
a determination of policy or judgment which the agency alone
is authorized to make and which it has not made.”40 In
Chenery II, the Court made a similar statement, describing
the rule of Chenery I as applying to a “determination or
judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized
to make.”41 Some courts and scholars view these statements
as excluding determinations of law from Chenery’s scope
because legal determinations and interpretations of statutes
are not exclusively entrusted to agencies. For instance, in
North Carolina Commission of Indian Affairs v. U.S.
Department of Labor, the Fourth Circuit relied on the
statement from Chenery II in concluding that Chenery did not
prevent the court from affirming the administrative law
judge’s (ALJ) order based on a statutory interpretation that
differed from the ALJ’s interpretation.42 The court stated:
“We do not . . . perceive there to be a Chenery problem in the
instant case because the question of interpretation of a
federal statute is not ‘a determination or judgment which an
administrative agency alone is authorized to make.’ ”43 The
Federal Circuit, in In re Comiskey, similarly relied on the
statement from Chenery I to limit the rule’s scope.44
The third statement that courts have cited in limiting
Chenery’s scope comes from Chenery I. The Court stated that
it was not “disturb[ing] the settled rule” from Helvering v.
Gowran that an appellate court must affirm a lower court’s
decision reaching the correct result “ ‘although the lower court
relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason,’ ”
explaining that “[i]t would be wasteful to send a case back to
a lower court to reinstate a decision which it had already
made but which the appellate court concluded should
properly be based on another ground within the power of the
40. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 88.
41. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196.
42. Comm’n of Indian Affairs, 725 F.2d at 240.
43. Id. (quoting Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196). The district court in Milk
Transport also relied on this statement in declining to apply Chenery to a
question of law. See Milk Transport, 190 F. Supp. at 354–55.
44. See In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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appellate court to formulate.”45
Although this statement quite plainly refers to review of
decisions of courts, not of agencies, courts have pointed to this
language as a clear statement that Chenery does not apply to
agencies’ determinations of law. In Arkansas AFL-CIO v.
FCC, for example, the Eighth Circuit quoted this language to
support its statement that “the Supreme Court clearly limited
Chenery to situations in which the agency failed to make a
necessary determination of fact or of policy.”46 The Federal
Circuit, in In re Comiskey and In re Aoyama, similarly
referred to this language regarding lower court decisions in
explaining why Chenery did not apply to a determination of
In Comiskey, the Federal Circuit described the
law.47
Supreme Court as having “made clear that a reviewing court
can (and should) affirm an agency decision on a legal ground
not relied upon by the agency if there is no issue of fact,
policy, or agency expertise.”48
The reliance on this third statement to exclude questions
of law from Chenery’s scope is analytically questionable.
Though the Supreme Court stated later in the same
paragraph that “[l]ike considerations govern review of
administrative orders,”49 the Court was there referring to a
limitation of the principle from Gowran: that the appellate
court, in reviewing a lower court, still may not take the place
of the jury.50 Thus, the better reading of the Court’s
statement in Chenery I is that the appellate court, just as it
cannot intrude into the jury’s domain by becoming a
factfinder, cannot intrude into the agency’s domain when
reviewing an agency’s action. While the Supreme Court’s
language may leave room for argument about what
constitutes the agency’s domain, it is a misreading of Chenery
to say that the motivations behind Gowran similarly apply to
review of agency decisions, or that the Court encouraged a
reviewing court to affirm an agency decision on a new legal
45. Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (citing Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S.
238, 245 (1937)).
46. Ark. AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1440 (8th Cir. 1993).
47. In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Comiskey, 554 F.3d
at 974.
48. Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 974.
49. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 88.
50. See id.
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ground.
Even if the first two statements from Chenery I and II
lend some support to the narrower view of the doctrine, that
view seems at odds with the original facts of Chenery, since
that case involved a legal error by the SEC.51 Moreover,
declining to apply Chenery to questions of law is inconsistent
with other characterizations of the doctrine by the Supreme
Court in dicta. In Federal Election Commission v. Akins, for
instance, the Court cited Chenery I for the proposition that
“[i]f a reviewing court agrees that the agency misinterpreted
the law, it will set aside the agency’s action and remand the
case.”52
In contrast to the courts and scholars who believe
Chenery is limited to questions of fact and policy, most others
view Chenery more broadly.53 Under this interpretation,
Chenery applies to most questions of law, thus limiting a
court’s rationales for affirmance in more cases. These courts
and scholars read Chenery II’s statement that its principle
applies to a “determination or judgment which an
administrative agency alone is authorized to make”54 to be a
much less substantial limitation on Chenery’s scope. They
interpret the language to mean that Chenery does not apply
to interpretations of statutes that are not committed to that
51. One court taking the narrower view of Chenery, however, reframed the
agency’s error in the original case. The Eighth Circuit, in discussing the facts of
Chenery in Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, described the Supreme Court as unable
to affirm the SEC’s decision not because it had made an erroneous legal
determination, but rather because the SEC had failed to make the subsidiary
factual findings that underlay the legal determination. The Eighth Circuit
described the SEC as having “made no factual findings with regard to misuse of
the fiduciary position, honesty, fair dealings, or fair pricing. Thus, the SEC
recited no factual grounds for the decision it made.” AFL-CIO, 11 F.3d at 1440.
The Eighth Circuit repeated this view of the SEC’s error five years later. See
HealthEast Bethesda Lutheran Hospital and Rehabilitation Center v. Shalala,
164 F.3d 415 (8th Cir. 1998).
52. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25 (1998).
53. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Bhd. Of Locomotive Eng’rs,
482 U.S. 270, 291 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[W]hen an agency explains
that it has denied a petition for reopening based on its understanding of the
underlying statute, a reviewing court may only uphold the agency decision if
that reasoning withstands review. . . . If the court of appeals finds legal error, it
must remand the case to the agency . . . . This is the lesson of Chenery and its
progeny . . . .”); cf. Stack, supra note 4, at 965–66, 1008–13 (discussing the scope
and limitations of Chenery’s application).
54. Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
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particular agency’s discretion—for instance, the APA—but
that it otherwise generally applies to interpretations of the
agency’s enabling statutes when the language is ambiguous.55
Even when courts interpret Chenery’s scope broadly,
however, it is worth noting that they do not apply it in all
applicable situations.
Courts have developed several
exceptions that soften the doctrine’s application in cases
where the costs of remand seem to significantly outweigh the
benefits.56 The “harmless-error” doctrine says that a case
should not be remanded under Chenery “when a mistake of
the administrative body is one that clearly had no bearing on
the procedure used or the substance of the decision
reached.”57 Another exception applies when the agency’s
decision is of “less than ideal clarity” but “the agency’s path
may reasonably be discerned.”58 Courts have also applied an
exception when agency action is statutorily compelled, and
thus remand would be “but a useless formality.”59
II. THE CHENERY DOCTRINE IN APPEALS OF PATENT DENIALS
Broad variation in courts’ interpretations of the Chenery
doctrine and in the administrative decisionmaking to which
Chenery is applied makes it difficult to study the doctrine
across different areas of law and different courts. In this
Article, I undertake a more focused analysis of Chenery’s
application in Federal Circuit review of patent denials by the
PTO. Focusing on one court and one substantive area of law
55. See Bank of Am. v. FDIC, 244 F.3d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Most . .
. decisions apply Chenery during analysis involving Chevron’s second step . . . .
That is the proper place for Chenery considerations to come into Chevron
analysis.”); Am.’s Cmty. Bankers v. FDIC, 200 F.3d 822, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(stating that the principle of Chenery “applies as well to our review of statutory
interpretations under the second prong of Chevron”); Stack, supra note 4, at
965–66, 1008–09.
56. See Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 613 (describing the “ ‘soften[ing] in [the
rule’s] application” (quoting 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 14:29, at 130 (2d ed. 1980))); cf. Note, Rationalizing Hard Look
Review After the Fact, supra note 5, at 1919–21 (discussing a weak form of the
Chenery rule and making a proposal for a similar “not particularly rigorous”
conception of Chenery).
57. Mass. Trs. of E. Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235, 248
(1964).
58. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286
(1974).
59. Friendly, supra note 5, at 210.
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allows for direct comparisons between different instances in
which Chenery has been addressed. The Federal Circuit is
particularly interesting because unlike most other courts, it
has taken the narrower view of Chenery that distinguishes
between issues of law and fact and thus allows for more
active judicial review of agency decisions. Exploring the
Federal Circuit’s application of Chenery thus also sheds
further light on how the doctrine mediates the balance of
power between the Federal Circuit and the PTO, and between
courts and agencies more generally.
A. Statutory Provisions for Judicial Review of PTO Decisions
Before turning to the Federal Circuit’s application of
Chenery, it is important to understand how PTO adjudication
of a patent application gets to the point of judicial review.
The PTO administers the Patent Act,60 which authorizes the
PTO to examine patent applications and issue patents for
applications meeting the requirements set forth in the
governing statute and regulations.61 Applications are first
reviewed by patent examiners,62 who have training in the
relevant area of technology.63 The examination focuses on the
application’s claims, which define the intellectual property
rights that the resulting patent would confer, if granted.64 If
an examiner rejects a claim twice, the applicant can appeal
the decision to a panel of three administrative patent
judges.65 This panel was previously called the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI),66 and was renamed
60. Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547,
1570 & n.122 (2011).
61. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL INFORMATION
CONCERNING PATENTS 1 (2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents
/resources/general_info_concerning_patents.pdf.
62. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2011).
63. All patent examiners have a technical undergraduate degree, and many
have higher degrees. Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful
Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415, 1506 (1995).
64. Claims are often analogized to the “metes and bounds” of a deed for real
property. ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 131 (5th ed. 2010).
65. 35 U.S.C.A. § 134(a) (West 2012); 35 U.S.C.A. § 6 (West 2012).
66. The BPAI was created by merging the Board of Appeals and the Board
of Interferences in 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3386 (1984); Jeffrey W.
Rennecker, Ex Parte Appellate Procedure in the Patent Office and the Federal
Circuit’s Respective Standards of Review, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 335, 351
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the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in 2012.67 Like the
decisions of most administrative agencies,68 an adverse
decision by the Board can be appealed by the applicant to an
Article III court.69 In appeals of such Board rejections of
patent applications, the Federal Circuit has exclusive
jurisdiction.70 In conducting its review, the Federal Circuit is
limited to “the record before the Patent and Trademark
Office.”71
The Federal Circuit also reviews patent-related decisions
by other institutions—namely on appeal from the
International Trade Commission (ITC)72 and from district
(1996).
67. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, § 7(a)(1) (2011). The
name change was implemented by the America Invents Act and took effect on
September 16, 2012. Pub. L. 112-29, § 7(e) (2011).
68. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 753–54 (describing that “[j]udicial review
is sometimes authorized by an agency’s organic statute . . . [m]ost commonly,
specific statutory provisions provide that a party may petition the federal court
of appeals to have an order set aside,” and “in the absence of a specific statutory
review provision applicable to the agency action in question, a person can now
ordinarily obtain review . . . by invoking one of the general or special
jurisdictional statutes to get into federal district court and invoking the APA as
the basis for the court to review the legality of the agency’s actions,” and as a
result, “[j]urisdictional problems in cases involving federal agency review have
virtually disappeared”).
69. 35 U.S.C.A. § 141 (West 2012). Alternatively, an applicant whose
application is denied by the Board may file a civil action against the Director of
the PTO in district court. 35 U.S.C.A. § 145 (West 2012). The venue for § 145
actions was previously the District Court for the District of Columbia, 35 U.S.C.
§ 145 (2006), but was changed by the America Invents Act to the District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-29, § 9, 125 Stat 284, 316 (2011); 35 U.S.C.A. § 145 (West 2012); Kappos
v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1694 n.1 (2012). A § 145 action cannot be filed if the
applicant has already appealed under § 141; by filing a § 141 appeal, the
applicant waives his or her right to file an action under § 145. 35 U.S.C.A.
§ 141(a) (West 2012). A § 145 civil action is not technically an appeal, and the
applicant can introduce new evidence that is not in the administrative record.
Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. at 1700–01. If the applicant introduces new evidence on a
disputed question of fact, the court makes de novo findings of fact based on the
new evidence and the record, id. at 1701, rather than following the substantial
evidence standard of review applied in Federal Circuit review of the PTO’s
factual findings in § 141 proceedings. Id. at 1694.
70. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (West 2012).
71. 35 U.S.C.A. § 144 (West 2012).
72. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(6) (West 2012). Under § 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, the ITC carries out investigations of allegations of unfair trade practices,
including infringement of patents. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006); U.S. INT’L
TRADE COMM’N, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS: ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2009).
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courts.73 In this Article, however, I focus on Chenery’s
application to appeals from the PTO. These appeals involve
the situation classically addressed by Chenery—direct appeal
of an agency’s decision. Appeals from the ITC also involve
direct review of agency decisions, and Chenery does apply.
However, the Federal Circuit has applied Chenery in only a
handful of patent-related ITC cases.74 The Federal Circuit
also reviews PTO decisions through indirect routes,75 but it is
not at all clear that Chenery should apply to these routes of
review, and in any event, there is no Federal Circuit
precedent applying Chenery in such cases.76 Studying the
73. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(1) (West 2012). In addition to reaching the
Federal Circuit through an appeal from a district court’s decision in a § 145
action, patent issues can also reach the Federal Circuit from a district court’s
decision in an infringement suit. After a patent is granted, it can be asserted by
a patentee in a civil action for infringement. 35 U.S.C.A. § 281 (West 2012) (“A
patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent.”). In
an infringement suit, the defendant will often use patent invalidity—in essence,
an assertion that the PTO was wrong in granting the patent—as a defense. See
35 U.S.C.A. § 282 (West 2012). In such cases, the patent has a presumption of
validity, id., but the presumption is rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence.
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011). These issues
could also arise from an action for a declaratory judgment.
74. The Federal Circuit has discussed Chenery in appeals from patentrelated decisions by the ITC in the cases of Interdigital Communications, L.L.C.
v. International Trade Commission, 690 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2012), Vizio,
Inc. v. International Trade Commission, 605 F.3d 1330, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010),
and in an opinion later vacated in Princo Corp. v. International Trade
Commission, 563 F.3d 1301, 1311 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh’g, vacated, 583 F.3d
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh’g, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010). It has also
addressed Chenery in an appeal from the ITC involving trade secrets. See
TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
75. These routes include the civil actions arising under 35 U.S.C. § 145 or
35 U.S.C. § 281, discussed above. See supra notes 69 and 73.
76. Addressing any potential role for Chenery in these appeals would
require answering fundamental questions as to what role Chenery has in quasicollateral attacks on agency decisions. It is likely that there is no doctrinal
grounding for Chenery’s application in collateral or quasi-collateral attacks on
agency decisions, as would be the case in § 145 and § 281 actions. In three of
the classic cases applying the principle of Chenery—Chenery itself, Overton
Park, and State Farm—the agency’s decisions were challenged under statutory
provisions for judicial review in the enabling act or APA. See Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
34 (1983) (“The Act also authorizes judicial review under the provisions of the
[APA] of all ‘orders establishing, amending, or revoking a Federal motor vehicle
safety standard,’ 15 U.S.C. § 1392(b). Under this authority, we review today
whether NHTSA acted arbitrarily and capriciously . . . .”); Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410–413 (1971) (finding petitioners
entitled to judicial review under § 701 of the APA); Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 81
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(1943) (“The respondents . . . brought this proceeding under § 24(a) of the Act to
review an order made by the Securities and Exchange Commission.”). Section
24(a) of the act provided that “ ‘[ a]ny person or party aggrieved by an order
issued by the [Securities and Exchange] Commission . . . may obtain a review of
such order in the circuit court of appeals of the United States . . . .’ ”
Reviewability of SEC “Orders” Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act,
15 U. CHI. L. REV. 966, 967 (1948) (quoting § 24(a), 49 Stat. 834 (1935), 15
U.S.C.A. § 79x(a) (1941)). Appeals under § 141 of the Patent Act are similarly
brought under a statutory provision explicitly providing for “appeal [of] the
Board’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”
35 U.S.C.A. § 141(a) (West 2012).
In contrast, § 145 provides that an applicant dissatisfied with the Board’s
decision may “have remedy by civil action against the Director.” 35 U.S.C.A.
§ 145 (West 2012). This language is clearly distinct from a direct provision of
judicial review, and thus the extent to which Chenery should or would apply is
unclear. While § 145 does not have the precise language providing for judicial
review or direct appeal, it is not a de novo proceeding, and to the extent that no
evidence were introduced at all, or no new evidence were introduced on a
particular issue, the proceeding would be very similar to that under § 141.
Thus, whether Chenery applies may depend on whether Chenery’s application is
dependent on formal distinctions—direct versus collateral attack, or explicit
provision of “judicial review” or “appeal” versus a “civil action”—or is dependent
on functional ideas about the role of the court’s consideration.
One classic Supreme Court case applying Chenery, Burlington Truck Lines,
did present a situation closer to a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 145. Burlington
Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962). There, the district
court’s review of the Interstate Commerce Commission’s order was under
statutory provisions authorizing the plaintiff to file a civil action to seek the
federal district court to restrain the order’s enforcement. Burlington Truck
Lines, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 194 F. Supp. 31 (S.D. Ill. 1961)
rev’d sub nom. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156.
This suggests that there may be a role for Chenery in civil actions under § 145.
Ultimately, however, I think it is extremely unlikely that Chenery would apply
in § 145 actions, at least in regard to issues on which new evidence were
introduced. In Kappos v. Hyatt, in which the Supreme Court addressed the
standard of review in § 145 actions where new evidence was presented to the
district court on a disputed question of fact, the Court concluded that the
district court “does not act as the ‘reviewing court’ envisioned by the APA,” 132
S. Ct. 1690, 1696 (2012) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706), and that it was “not persuaded
. . . that § 145 proceedings are governed by the deferential principles of agency
review.” Id. at 1697. Although Chenery may not be part of the APA scheme, see
infra note 253, the broader meaning of the Court’s opinion in Hyatt suggests
Chenery would not apply.
It is even less likely that Chenery would apply in an action under § 281,
which provides only that “[a] patentee shall have remedy by civil action for
infringement of his patent.” 35 U.S.C.A. § 281 (West 2012). Review of a
patent’s validity in a § 281 action is not directly provided for at all; it is a result
of the affirmative defense of patent invalidity in § 282. 35 U.S.C.A. § 282 (West
2012). Thus, considerations about formal distinctions in statutory provisions
strongly indicate that Chenery would not apply in § 281 actions. Furthermore,
without serious overhaul of the current system of patent adjudication, applying
Chenery to patent validity in § 281 actions would seem to impermissibly
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Federal Circuit’s review of appeals of PTO patent denials
thus provides the greatest insight into Chenery.
B. Standards of Review Applied in Federal Circuit Review of
PTO Decisions
For most of the period since administrative law began to
develop and grow, patent law has largely existed apart from
the general body of administrative law principles.77 In
reviewing PTO decisions, the Federal Circuit has deviated
from administrative law in significant ways. For instance, as
recently as 1998, the Federal Circuit denied that the APA
applied to its review of factual decisions by the PTO.78 The
Federal Circuit has also repeatedly stated that it gives no
deference to legal determinations by the PTO,79 despite
diminish the property rights associated with a patent. Cf. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999)
(“Patents . . . have long been considered a species of property. As such, they are
surely included within the ‘property’ of which no person may be deprived by a
State without due process of law.” (citations omitted)). If a patent owner were
only allowed to bring arguments in support of validity that had been made in
the initial adjudication, the patent owner’s ability to defend the validity of his
patent would be severely constrained, and the effective strength of the patent
would be dependent on the thoroughness of the arguments made in the patent’s
prosecution—a record that can be significantly thinner than a record in a patent
denial. Patents are sometimes granted with essentially no record if the
examiner deems the claims patentable on the first review. See Mark A. Lemley
& Bhaven Sampat, Examining Patent Examination, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
2, ¶ 7 (2010) (finding that 13.5% of patents were granted without any argument
or negotiation).
77. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 270 (“[T]he patent law
community has tended to pay little attention to administrative law.”); Adam
Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative State, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2002 (2009) (“[A]dministrative lawyers did not discuss
intellectual property, and intellectual property lawyers similarly did not discuss
administrative law. Throughout the twentieth century, administrative law and
intellectual property law seemed as if they were hermetically sealed off from
each other in both theory and practice.”); Wm. Redin Woodward, A
Reconsideration of the Patent System as a Problem of Administrative Law, 55
HARV. L. REV. 950, 950 & fn.1 (1942) (noting that the American Bar
Association’s proposed general revision of administrative procedure and review
and the bill of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure
both excepted the Patent Office).
78. In re Zurko (Zurko II), 142 F.3d 1447, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
79. See, e.g., PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342,
1359 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Obviousness is a legal conclusion that we review de
novo.”); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“This
court reviews statutory interpretation, the central issue in this case, without
deference.” (citing Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir.
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administrative law doctrine suggesting at least some
deference should be given.80
The landscape changed with the 1999 U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Dickinson v. Zurko (Zurko III).81 In earlier
stages of the litigation—Zurko I before the Federal Circuit,82
and Zurko II before the court en banc83—the Federal Circuit
held that factual findings by the PTO are reviewed under the
“court/court” standard of review rather than the more
deferential “agency/court” standard of review under the
APA.84 On certiorari, however, the Supreme Court reversed
the Federal Circuit, holding that the Federal Circuit must
review PTO decisions of fact under the standards set forth in
the APA for review of administrative agency action.85
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Zurko III, many
scholars have addressed the standards of review that should
apply to different decisions by the PTO, and whether the
Federal Circuit is applying the standards correctly.86 But
these analyses have largely ignored the question of what
evidence or reasoning the reviewing court can consider in
assessing whether the necessary standard is met.87 This, as
1996))); Cybor Corp. v. Fas Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(“[C]laim construction, as a purely legal issue, is subject to de novo review on
appeal.”).
80. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 300; infra note 263. The Federal
Circuit has also given decisions by the ITC less deference than it may be due
under general administrative law principles. See generally Kumar, supra note
60 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s failure to grant the ITC Chevron deference
and arguing that the ITC’s patent validity and enforceability decisions should
be granted Chevron deference).
81. Dickinson v. Zurko (Zurko III), 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
82. In re Zurko (Zurko I), 111 F.3d 887, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
83. Zurko II, 142 F.3d at 1449 (“We believe section 559 of the
Administrative Procedure Act permits, and stare decisis warrants, our
continued application of the clearly erroneous standard in our review of these
fact-findings.”).
84. Zurko III, 527 U.S. at 153–54.
85. Id. at 152.
86. See, e.g., Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12; William J. Blonigan, Road
Under Construction: Administrative Claim Interpretations and the Path of
Greater Deference from the Federal Circuit to the Patent Office, 35 AIPLA Q.J.
415 (2007); Thomas Chen, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron
Deference, 94 VA. L. REV. 1165 (2008); Dennis J. Harney, The Obvious Need for
Deference: Federal Circuit Review of Patent and Trademark Office
Determinations of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 61
(2002).
87. The exception is the recent article by Professor Kumar, supra note 5, at
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Part I explained, is the Chenery question.
C. Chenery’s Declared Scope in the Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit’s declared rule for applying Chenery
has not always been clear, but it now seems settled that the
Federal Circuit adopts the narrower view of the doctrine’s
scope. If the question is one of fact, the court may affirm only
on a ground articulated by the agency. But if the question is
one of law, the court need not remand, and it may affirm on a
ground not previously articulated by the agency in the
record.88 But the route to this current prevailing Federal
Circuit view has not been straightforward.
Soon after its creation in 1982,89 the Federal Circuit
applied the Chenery doctrine for the first time in In re
Hounsfield, an appeal from an application for reissue of a
There, the Commissioner of Patents and
patent.90
267–74.
88. In addition to articulating this law/fact divide, the Federal Circuit has
adopted some of the exceptions to the Chenery doctrine in reviewing PTO
denials. In reviewing PTO decisions, the Federal Circuit has used the exception
of harmless error once. See In re Watts, 354 F.3d 1362, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
It has applied the exception of reasonable discernability twice. See In re
Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1294–95 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Huston
308 F.3d 1267, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The Federal Circuit has used the
exception that Chenery does not apply when the outcome is dictated by statute
in reviewing decisions by other agencies, though not in reviewing decisions by
the PTO. See Winters v. Gober, 219 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reviewing
a decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals).
89. See Marion T. Bennett, The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit—Origins, in THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY, 1982–1990, at 7–8 (1991).
90. In re Hounsfield, 699 F.2d 1320, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1983). A reissue
application allows a patent owner to fix certain types of problems in an issued
patent. If, for instance, the patent owner finds a piece of prior art that
invalidates one of her issued claims, she can submit a reissue application to the
PTO to narrow that claim, making it valid in light of the newly discovered prior
art. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 251 (West 2012); ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN
FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1074 (4th ed. 2007).
The Federal Circuit’s predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA), Bennett, supra note 89, at 7, had invoked the Chenery doctrine
once. See Sealed Air Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 645 F.2d 976 (C.C.P.A.
1981). In that case, the CCPA seemingly misapplied Chenery completely, citing
it for the proposition that “[t]he ITC’s mistaken belief that it required in
personam jurisdiction was not determinative of the result, and its decision must
be affirmed where the result is correct, notwithstanding its reliance on a wrong
ground or a wrong reason.” Id. at 986 (citing Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1942)).
The dissent vigorously disagreed with the majority’s use of Chenery, discussing
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Trademarks attempted to provide a post hoc rationalization
for the Board’s decision.91 The court rejected this attempt,
citing Chenery,92 though the court did not specifically address
the scope of the doctrine or why the court should apply
Chenery in that case.
The Federal Circuit first articulated a narrower view of
the doctrine in 1985 in Spears v. Merit Systems Protection
Board, a non-patent case. In an appeal from a decision by the
Merit Systems Protection Board, the court suggested that
Chenery was properly applied only when the agency had
made a policy determination or exercised discretion.93 The
court stated that “it would be wasteful to remand the case
based on [Chenery], because any action by the MSPB would
not involve policymaking or discretion.”94
Despite this initial suggestion that Chenery had a
narrowed scope, the Federal Circuit applied the doctrine with
no such limitation for the greater part of the next decade.
Less than five months after Spears, the court applied Chenery
to remand a decision that turned on a question of law. In
reviewing a decision by the PTO to deny a requested filing
date, the Federal Circuit cited Chenery in holding that
“[s]ince the Commissioner’s decision rested on faulty legal
premises, such action cannot be sustained.”95 From 1985 to
1992, none of the Federal Circuit’s other references to
Chenery articulated a narrow view of the doctrine.96 Instead,
the Federal Circuit described the rule more generally with
statements such as “[w]e are powerless to affirm an
administrative action on a ground not relied upon by the
Chenery in detail and arguing that “[n]ot even the broadest reading of
[Chenery]” allowed the majority’s approach. Id. at 996–98 (Nies, J., dissenting).
91. Hounsfield, 699 F.2d at 1324. More details about this case can be found
in the text accompanying footnotes 327–333.
92. Hounsfield, 699 F.2d at 1324.
93. Spears v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 766 F.2d 520, 523 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
94. Id.
95. Dubost v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 777 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
96. Among others, these opinions included Intrepid v. Pollock, 972 F.2d
1355 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Thomas v. Cheney, 925 F.2d 1407, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
Timken Co. v. United States, 894 F.2d 385, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Acerno v.
Department of Health & Human Services, 815 F.2d 680, 685–86 (Fed. Cir.
1987); Turner v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 806 F.2d 241, 246 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
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agency,”97 or “[w]e must review the Board’s decision on the
grounds on which it was made.”98 In these opinions, it is
unclear whether the court viewed Chenery’s scope more
broadly, or whether the context simply made it unnecessary
to discuss Chenery’s scope in more detail.
The first suggestion that Chenery applied to questions of
fact but not law (with no mention of whether it applied to
policy determinations) came in Killip v. Office of Personnel
Management in 1993, also an appeal from a Merit Systems
Protection Board decision.99 There, the Federal Circuit stated
that it was not bound by the general rule of Chenery because
the decision did “not depend upon making a determination of
fact not previously made by the Board,” and because “courts
are free to review the interpretation of the federal statute
authorizing an agency to act.”100 Later that year, the court
reiterated this view using almost identical language in Cain
v. Office of Personnel Management.101
Since Killip and Cain, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly
invoked the limitation that Chenery does not apply to
questions of law, and thus does not limit judicial review in
such cases.102 After restating this view several times outside
97. NEC Home Electronics, Ltd. v. United States, 54 F.3d 736, 743 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
98. Drumheller v. Dep’t of the Army, 49 F.3d 1566, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
99. Killip v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 991 F.2d 1564, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
100. Id. at 1569.
101. Cain v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 11 F.3d 1071, *3 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
102. The Federal Circuit has not invoked the limitation in every case
involving Chenery, however. In a number of cases, the court has described the
doctrine in general terms, without indicating whether there are limitations on
its scope. In appeals from Board patent denials, see, for example, In re Nouvel,
2012 WL 3716769, *4 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The Board’s judgment must be reviewed
on the grounds upon which the Board actually relied . . . . Alternative grounds
supporting the Board’s decision are not considered.”); In re Daneshvar, 366 Fed.
Appx. 171, 173 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“At this stage, we are limited to reviewing the
grounds relied on by the agency.”); In re Wheeler, 304 Fed. Appx. 867, 870 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (“Our appellate review is limited to the grounds relied on by the
agency.”).
Moreover, in one appeal of a patent rejection by the Board, the Federal
Circuit seemingly endorsed the broader view of Chenery as applying to
questions of law. See In re Lee, 277 F.3d at 1345–46 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In In re
Lee, when the PTO proposed an alternative ground for affirmance on appeal
before the Federal Circuit, the court declined to consider the alternative ground,
quoting the U.S. Supreme Court’s statement in Federal Election Commission v.
Akins that “ ‘ [i]f a reviewing court agrees that the agency misinterpreted the
law, it will set aside the agency’s action and remand the case—even though the
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the patent realm,103 the Federal Circuit first directly
articulated this narrow view of Chenery’s scope in an appeal
of a PTO decision in In re Comiskey in 2007.104 When the
opinion was revised after rehearing en banc in 2009, the court
In the Comiskey
retained its discussion of Chenery.105
opinions, the Federal Circuit discussed Chenery in depth,106
concluding that “Chenery not only permits us to supply a new
legal ground for affirmance, but encourages such a resolution
where, as here, ‘[i]t would be wasteful to send’ the case back
to the agency . . . .”107 The Federal Circuit again stated that
Chenery does not apply to questions of law in two other
patent appeals from the Board in 2009,108 one in 2011,109 and
agency (like a new jury after a mistrial) might later, in the exercise of its lawful
discretion, reach the same result for a different reason.’ ” Id. at 1346 (quoting
Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25 (1998)).
103. These decisions included Stoyanov v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
involving review of the Board’s dismissal of appeals for lack of jurisdiction, 218
Fed. Appx. 988, 992–93 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Board argues . . . because the
Board’s jurisdiction is a legal question not involving deference and does not
require additional fact finding, we should affirm the Board’s decision despite its
factual error. . . . [W]e agree . . . .”), Defenders of Wildlife v. Hogarth, involving
review of a decision by the National Marine Fisheries Service, 330 F.3d 1358,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“In this case, there is not a Chenery problem for two
reasons. . . . [W]e are not required to make additional factual findings, as was
the case in Chenery. . . . [W]e conclude that the agency would have reached the
same conclusion had it addressed the legal issue on which we rest our
judgment.”), and Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, involving review of an
antidumping proceeding by the Department of Commerce, 95 F.3d 1094, 1101
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (“In the present case . . . the sole issue is one of statutory
construction . . . .
That is not ‘a determination or judgment which an
administrative agency alone is authorized to make.’ ” (quoting Chenery II, 332
U.S. 194, 196 (1947))).
104. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007), withdrawn and
superseded on reh’g by In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Circ. 2009) (“We have
repeatedly applied Chenery and have said that ‘[w]e may, however, where
appropriate, affirm the [agency] on grounds other than those relied upon in
rendering its decision, when upholding the [agency’s] decision does not depend
upon making a determination of fact not previously made by the [agency].’ ”
(quoting Killip v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 991 F.2d 1564, 1568–69 (Fed. Cir.
1993))).
105. See Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 974.
106. See id. at 973–75; Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1372–73; see also supra notes
44, 47–48 and accompanying text.
107. Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 975 (quoting Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943));
Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1373 (quoting Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 88).
108. See In re POD-NERS, L.L.C., 337 Fed. Appx. 901, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(per curiam) (“[Chenery] does not necessarily apply in full force where the
agency decision was on a legal issue and did not involve any exercise of its
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one in 2012, citing the discussion in Comiskey.110 The Federal
Circuit has also applied this view of Chenery in an appeal
from an investigation regarding patents at the ITC.111
D. The Federal Circuit’s Application of the Doctrine
Although the Federal Circuit now consistently articulates
the view that Chenery applies to questions of fact but not law,
the actual application of this approach has proven to be
unpredictable. Several cases in which the Federal Circuit has
discussed Chenery illustrate two reasons why the Federal
Circuit’s application of the doctrine has been inconsistent.
First, whether the question before the court is one of law or
fact depends on the level of generality with which the court
views the question. Second, the court is inconsistent in
identifying the relevant question.112

expert discretion.”); In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1267 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(“Because this aspect is a matter of law, it does not raise an issue of the Chenery
doctrine . . . .”).
109. See In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Comiskey
for the proposition that the court can “affirm the agency on grounds other than
those relied upon in rendering its decision, when upholding the agency’s
decision does not depend upon making a determination of fact not previously
made by the agency” (citing Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 974)).
110. Flo Healthcare Solutions, L.L.C. v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, 1375 n.7
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
111. In Princo Corp. v. International Trade Commission, in an opinion later
vacated, the court stated that Chenery did not prevent upholding the ITC’s
decision on an alternative ground because the issue was “a legal matter well
within the competence of an appellate tribunal to decide.” 563 F.3d 1301, 1312
n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh’g, vacated, 583 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh’g, 616
F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
112. In this Article, I focus on questions of law and fact, not questions of
policy or exercises of discretion. This is because, although the Federal Circuit
does occasionally recognize that the PTO exercises discretion, see, e.g., Star
Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005), it is quite
rare. The court has stated that Chenery would apply to an exercise of discretion
by the PTO, see POD-NERS, 337 Fed. Appx. at 904, but I did not find any
instances of the court doing so. Professors Benjamin and Rai have described the
Federal Circuit as having “failed to recognize policy decisions as a separate
category of PTO behavior” and as having “extreme discomfort with a policy
category as applied to PTO decisions,” even though it recognizes exercises of
discretion by other agencies whose decisions it reviews. Benjamin & Rai, supra
note 12, at 305–06.
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1. Inconsistency Due to Level of Generality
One primary reason for the apparent inconsistency in
Chenery’s application is that whether a particular question is
one of law or fact often depends on the level of generality at
which the court views the question. As compared to many
other substantive areas in which Chenery is applied, the
relationship between law and fact in patent law is especially
intertwined.113 The basic framework for law and fact is that
most issues of patent validity are questions of law with
underlying issues of fact, while patent infringement is a
question of fact with underlying issues of law.114 Within
statutory requirements for patent validity, issues of law with
underlying issues of fact include: whether claims are
patentable subject matter;115 whether claims are barred
because the invention was already on sale or in public use;116
whether claims are enabled117 and definite;118 whether there
is obvious-type double-patenting;119 and whether claims are
obvious.120 Yet, other requirements for validity are questions
of fact, sometimes with underlying questions of law: whether
the invention meets the utility requirement;121 whether a

113. Professors Allen and Pardo point to patent law as one of “the more
salient areas where the law-fact distinction plays a significant role.” Ronald J.
Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 1769, 1787 (2003). But they have a pessimistic view about the
meaningfulness of the law/fact divide and describe Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), in which the Supreme Court held that
the scope of patent claims is a question of law, as “yet another demonstration of
the analytically empty but pragmatically important concept of ‘questions of
law.’ ” Allen & Pardo, supra, at 1784. They describe “legal” as meaning simply
“judge decides” but having no more meaningful basis. See id. at 1787.
114. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 90, at 1063. Infringement decisions are
not made by the PTO, but by district courts, so I will not discuss the division of
law and fact in infringement in any detail.
115. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom.,
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
116. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng’g, Inc., 249 F.3d 1307, 1310 (Fed.
Cir. 2001); Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
117. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 267 F.3d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
118. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1181 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
119. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
120. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
121. Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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claim is anticipated;122 and whether the written description123
and best mode requirements124 are met.
Thus, at a higher level of generality a question may be
one of law, but at a more specific level it may depend on a
question of fact—or vice versa. As a result, whether the
Federal Circuit applies Chenery can be highly dependent on
the level of generality at which the question is framed. This
makes the court’s decisions regarding Chenery sometimes
unpredictable and seemingly inconsistent with each other.
i.

Layered Law and Fact in Obviousness Rejections

One area of mixed questions of law and fact where the
application of the Chenery doctrine is particularly
unpredictable is in obviousness determinations. An invention
is patentable only if it is not “obvious.”125 An invention is
obvious if it would have been obvious to a person with
ordinary skill in the field, given the already-existing
inventions, at the time the invention was made.126 Though
the ultimate determination of obviousness is one of law, it
relies on several inquiries that the Supreme Court has held to
be questions of fact. These include “the scope and content of
the prior art,” the “differences between the prior art and the
claims at issue,” and “the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art.”127 Thus, if the question is framed at a more
general level, focusing on obviousness itself, the question is
one of law, and Chenery does not apply, leaving judicial
review broad. But if the question is framed at a more specific
level, the question is one of fact, and Chenery applies,
122. Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
123. Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
124. N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 1286 (Fed. Cir.
2000). The America Invents Act removed failure to comply with best mode as an
invalidity defense, although disclosure of the best mode remains a requirement
for obtaining a patent. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, §
15, 125 Stat. 284, 328 (2011).
125. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West 2012).
126. Id. at § 103(a) (“A patent may not be obtained though the invention is
not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102, if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the
manner in which the invention was made.”).
127. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
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narrowing judicial review.
An example of the how the layering of law and fact in
obviousness determinations can arise in a case implicating
Chenery is the 2011 Federal Circuit decision in In re Klein.
There, the examiner and Board had relied on five pieces of
prior art in an obviousness rejection.128 Klein, the applicant,
argued that these pieces of prior art could not be the basis for
an obviousness rejection because they were not “analogous”
prior art.129 The Federal Circuit agreed with Klein.130 On
appeal, the PTO tried to raise a new argument for why the
prior art was analogous, but the Federal Circuit relied on
Chenery in rejecting the argument.131 Although the ultimate
question of obviousness is a question of law, the subsidiary
question of whether prior art is analogous is a question of
fact.132 Because the Federal Circuit identified the relevant
issue for Chenery purposes as the subsidiary factual question,
the court applied Chenery. If the court had instead focused
more broadly on whether the claims were obvious—a question
of law—it would not have applied Chenery and could have
considered the PTO’s new arguments.
The court’s identification of the dispositive issue as the
subsidiary factual question, and the resulting application of
Chenery, seems reasonable in Klein. But in other cases, the
Federal Circuit’s decisions about whether the Chenery
doctrine should apply seem more tenuous. In two patent
rejections that were quite similar to each other, the court
acted in different ways, applying the Chenery doctrine in one,
and not applying it in the other. In In re POD-NERS, L.L.C.,
the Federal Circuit focused on the more general question of
obviousness, thus concluding that Chenery did not apply
because the issue was one of law.133 There, the Board held
128. In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1346–47 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
129. Id. at 1350–52. If a piece of prior art is not analogous, it cannot be
considered in determining whether a patent is obvious. See Innovention Toys,
L.L.C. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Prior art is
analogous if it is “from the same field of endeavor” or if it is “reasonably
pertinent to the particular problem” the inventor is trying to address. Klein,
647 F.3d at 1348.
130. Klein, 647 F.3d at 1350, 1352.
131. See id. at 1351 n.1, 1352 n.2.
132. Id. at 1347.
133. In re POD-NERS, L.L.C., 337 Fed. Appx. 901 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per
curiam). This opinion, and several others I discuss in this Article, are
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that an application’s claims related to a bean plant were
invalid on multiple grounds, including obviousness.134 The
Board based its conclusion on the bean’s similarity to another
well-known bean,135 relying on a published study and a
declaration from a seed specialist.136 On appeal, the Federal
Circuit determined that the Board “did not explain its
conclusion in detail” in finding the claims obvious.137 The
court acknowledged that Chenery generally required it to
review Board decisions based on the grounds articulated by
the agency.138 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the
doctrine did not restrict its ability to affirm this particular
decision, because the Board “unequivocally h[e]ld the claims
to be obvious, which was a legal determination,” and Chenery
did not “necessarily apply in full force where the agency
decision was on a legal issue and did not involve any exercise

unpublished. Many Federal Circuit opinions are unpublished: from 1982 to
2003, approximately seventy-seven percent were unpublished. See Beth Zeitlin
Shaw, Please Ignore this Case: An Empirical Study of Nonprecedential Opinions
in the Federal Circuit, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1013, 1028 tbl.1(b) (2004). In
appeals from the PTO, approximately forty-two percent were unpublished. Id.
at 1027 tbl.1(a). Before 2006, unpublished opinions could not normally be cited
by parties before the Federal Circuit. See id. at 1018. But in 2006, the
Supreme Court adopted Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, which bars
courts from restricting citations to unpublished opinions issued in 2007 or later.
FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 (2007). The Federal Circuit has stated that though the
“decision itself receives due care,” these opinions “do not represent the
considered view of the Federal Circuit regarding aspects of a particular case
beyond the decision itself,” and “they are not intended to convey this court’s
view of law applicable in other cases.” Hamilton v. Brown, 39 F.3d 1574, 1581
(Fed. Cir. 1994). It is therefore important to draw conclusions from unpublished
opinions with care. However, the Federal Circuit cannot be excused from
consistent application of Chenery simply because a case is unpublished. It must
be held accountable for how it applies the doctrine in all cases—the court can
encroach on agency power by substituting its own reasoning in an unpublished
decision just as in a published one.
134. POD-NERS, 337 Fed. Appx. at 902. The proceeding combined a
reexamination and reissue. Id at 901. For an explanation of reissue, see supra
note 90. Reexamination allows for reconsideration of the patentability of the
patent based on prior art patents and printed publications. See U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2209 (8th
ed. 2001).
135. POD-NERS, 337 Fed. Appx. at 902.
136. Ex parte POD-NERS, L.L.C., No. 2007-3938, 2008 WL 1901980, passim
(B.P.A.I. April 29, 2008).
137. POD-NERS, 337 Fed. Appx. at 904.
138. Id.
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of its expert discretion.”139 Thus, by identifying the relevant
question as the ultimate legal determination of obviousness,
not as the underlying factual determinations, the court could
supply its own explanation of why the prior art rendered the
claims obvious and affirm the decision.140
The Federal Circuit’s approach in POD-NERS was
seemingly inconsistent with that of an earlier case, In re
Thrift.
The court in Thrift similarly addressed an
obviousness rejection, but that time the court focused on the
underlying factual determinations, therefore concluding that
Chenery did apply to limit judicial review. In Thrift, the
patent examiner rejected claims in a patent application for
The examiner
voice-activated hypermedia systems.141
concluded that two of the claims were obvious because the
technique they described was “old and well known in the art
of speech recognition as a means of optimization which is
highly desirable.”142 The Board affirmed the examiner’s
rejection of these claims on appeal and denied the request to
reconsider on rehearing.143 The Federal Circuit found the
examiner’s and Board’s conclusions insufficiently supported.
The court stated that “the Board’s ground of rejection is
simply inadequate on its face.”144 The rejection was faulty,
the court explained, because it was based only on a “very
More
general and broad conclusion of obviousness.”145
specifically, the court critiqued the agency for not addressing
each of the individual elements of the claims.146
In its brief to the Federal Circuit, the PTO provided new
justifications for affirming the Board’s rejection. With respect
to the first of the two claims, the PTO argued that the
139. Id.
140. See id. at 903–04.
141. In re Thrift, 298 F.3d 1357, 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “Hypermedia”
is “a database format similar to hypertext in which text, sound, or video images
related to that on a display can be accessed directly from the display.”
Hypermedia Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/hyper-media (last visited Jan. 7, 2013).
142. Thrift, 298 F.3d at 1362. The claims required that the system allow a
user to create a specific phrase, called a “grammar,” that could be linked to a
web address. Id. at 1360–61.
143. Id. at 1362.
144. Id. at 1366.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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applicants had not raised their arguments before the Board in
a timely manner, and they therefore had waived those
arguments.147 With respect to the second claim, the PTO
argued that one of the cited references disclosed information
making the claim limitations obvious.148 The court, however,
relied on Chenery to dismiss both arguments, saying that
because the Board had not relied on these grounds for
rejection, they could not be the basis for Federal Circuit
affirmance.149
The outcomes in POD-NERS and Thrift are hard to
reconcile. Both involved insufficiently detailed rejections for
obviousness. In POD-NERS, the court said that “the Board
did not explain its conclusion in detail,”150 and in Thrift, the
Board based its rejection on a “very general and broad
conclusion of obviousness.”151 We might therefore expect the
Federal Circuit to apply the Chenery doctrine in both cases
because the underlying factual findings were unsatisfactory,
or to apply it in neither case because the general conclusions
of obviousness were unsatisfactory. Instead, in POD-NERS,
the court focused on the agency’s broad conclusion of
obviousness, thus avoiding Chenery;152 in Thrift, the court
focused on the lack of particular subsidiary findings, thus
applying Chenery.153 In isolation, either approach seems
reasonable—but the inconsistency between the two decisions
is troubling. Though it is certainly possible ex post to craft
arguments for why Chenery should apply in Thrift but not
POD-NERS, confidently predicting these outcomes would
147. Id. at 1366 & n.1; Brief for Appellee Director of the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office at 20–26, In re Thrift, 298 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (No. 011445), 2001 WL 34624101.
148. Thrift, 298 F.3d at 1366–67.
149. Id.
150. In re POD-NERS, L.L.C., 337 Fed. Appx. 901, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per
curiam).
151. Thrift, 298 F.3d at 1366.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 139–140.
153. In Thrift, unlike POD-NERS, the court did not explicitly address
Chenery’s scope and the distinction between questions of law and fact.
Therefore, it is also possible that the court applied Chenery not because it
identified the question as one of fact, but because it took a broader view of
Chenery. In a later case, however, the Federal Circuit pointed to Thrift as
properly applying Chenery because affirmance would require factual
determinations not originally considered by the PTO. See In re Comiskey, 554
F.3d 967, 974–75 & n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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have been quite difficult.
ii. Federal Circuit Recognition of Layered Law and
Fact
Some Federal Circuit decisions involving Chenery do
recognize implications of layered law and fact. In In re
Comiskey, the examiner and Board rejected the applicant’s
claims as obvious.154 Although the agency based its decision
on obviousness, the Federal Circuit, hearing the appeal en
banc, requested supplemental briefing after oral argument on
another possible ground for rejection—whether Comiskey’s
In his
claims described patentable subject matter.155
supplemental brief, Comiskey argued that the Federal Circuit
could not affirm the rejection of the claims based on the
claims’ failure to describe patentable subject matter because
the examiner and Board had not raised that ground for
rejection.156 But the Federal Circuit dismissed Comiskey’s
argument. It reasoned that although the agency had not
addressed the issue of patentable subject matter, the court
could nonetheless properly affirm the rejection based on it.157
The court explained that because whether a claim is
patentable subject matter is a question of law, Chenery did
not apply.158 It did recognize, however, that “there may be
cases in which the legal question as to patentable subject
matter may turn on subsidiary factual issues.”159 The court
implied that in those cases, Chenery would bar a new reason
for affirmance.

154. Id. at 972.
155. Id. 35 U.S.C. § 101 limits the types of things that can be patented:
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2012).
156. Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 972; Appellant Supplemental Letter Brief, In re
Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Nos. 2006-1286), 2007 WL 869874.
157. Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 975.
158. Id. (“It is well-established that ‘whether the asserted claims . . . are
invalid for failure to claim statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, is a
question of law . . . .’ As a question of law, lack of statutory subject matter is a
‘ground [for affirmance] within the power of the appellate court to formulate.’ ”
(quoting AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
1999) and Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943))).
159. Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 975.
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The Federal Circuit again recognized that a legal issue
might turn on underlying factual findings in In re Aoyama, a
2011 decision.160 There, the court affirmed a rejection on a
new ground that was a question of law.161 The court concluded
that Chenery did not bar affirmance on the new ground, even
though it might be “predicated upon ‘a determination of policy
or judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make,’ ”
because the underlying factual determination had already
been made in a different context.162 As in Comiskey, the court
distinguished the case from “ ‘situations that required factual
determinations not made by the agency.’ ”163
Although the Federal Circuit recognized in Comiskey and
Aoyama that a legal issue might turn on a subsidiary factual
issue—and therefore that Chenery would apply to the broader
legal issue—other cases suggest that the Federal Circuit does
not always keep this complexity in mind. For instance, recall
that in In re POD-NERS the court said that Chenery did not
preclude affirmance, because the Board’s determination of
obviousness was a legal one.164 This fails to acknowledge that
any obviousness rejection by the PTO requires a set of factual
determinations: the scope and content of the prior art, the
differences between the prior art and the applicant’s claims,
and the level of ordinary skill in the art.165 POD-NERS
reflected the type of situation described in Comiskey—a case
in which the legal question turned on subsidiary factual
determinations that had not been clearly articulated by the
agency—yet the court still held that Chenery did not apply.
iii. Layered Law and Fact in Anticipation Rejections
It is even more clear in anticipation rejections that the
court does not always keep these implications of layered law
and fact in mind. To obtain a patent, the applicant’s
160. In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2011). For a more detailed
discussion of this case, see the text accompanying notes 183–188.
161. Aoyama, 656 F.3d at 1299, 1301.
162. Id. at 1300 (citing Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943)). The dissent
criticized the court’s opinion as “defying the requirements for appellate review
of agency action,” citing Chenery. See id. at 1304 (Newman, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 1299 (quoting Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 974).
164. In re POD-NERS, L.L.C., 337 Fed. Appx. 901, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per
curiam).
165. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
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invention cannot be “anticipated.” If every element of a claim
was previously disclosed in a single piece of prior art—that is,
if the invention is not new—it will be rejected as
anticipated.166 Unlike obviousness, anticipation is a question
Determining whether patent claims are
of fact.167
anticipated, however, involves a two-step analysis that
includes first construing the claims, which is a question of
law.168 If, as the Federal Circuit recognized in Comiskey and
Aoyama, a subsidiary issue of fact underlying a question of
law could cause Chenery to apply, then by analogy a
subsidiary question of law (e.g., claim construction) surely
could not insulate the broader question of fact (e.g.,
anticipation) from the Chenery doctrine.
Yet, the Federal Circuit has used a claim construction
issue within an anticipation rejection to avoid the constraints
of Chenery. The applicant in In re Skvorecz applied for
reissue of a patent for a wire chafing stand, a device used by
caterers to hold hot pans of food.169 The examiner rejected
one of Skovrecz’s claims as anticipated by another patent, and
the Board affirmed the rejection.170 On appeal, the Federal
Circuit rejected the Board’s reasoning. The court held that
the Board had misunderstood the invention in the other
patent, and that it did not in fact have all of the elements in
Skovrecz’s claim.171 In response, the PTO argued that there
166. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 2012); MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 90, at
1060–61.
167. See Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
168. In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Cybor Corp.
v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[W]e therefore
reaffirm that, as a purely legal question, we review claim construction de novo
on appeal including any allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim
construction.”); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970–71
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[T]he interpretation and construction of patent claims, which
define the scope of the patentee’s rights under the patent, is a matter of law
exclusively for the court.”).
169. In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
170. Id. at 1265–66.
171. Id. at 1267. The claim at issue in Skovrecz’s patent required that each
of the stands’ wire legs have lateral offsets near the rim, allowing the stands to
nest closely when stacked, without becoming wedged together and difficult to
separate. See id. at 1263, 1265. The other patent (the “Buff patent”) appeared
to have several legs without any lateral offsets, but the examiner and Board
concluded that these were not actually “legs” but “transverse members.”
Therefore, the Buff patent could anticipate Skvorecz’s claims without these
elements having offsets. Id. at 1267. The Federal Circuit held on appeal that
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was an alternative way to construe the claim that would
support rejecting it as anticipated.172 Although the PTO was
suggesting a new reason for affirmance, the Federal Circuit
said Chenery did not bar the new reason.173 The court stated
that such post hoc rationalization “d[id] not raise an issue of
the Chenery doctrine” and was thus permissible, because
claim construction is a matter of law.174 Thus, by focusing on
the subsidiary legal issue of claim construction, the court
circumvented the constraints of Chenery, even though that
legal issue bore ultimately on a question of fact.175
As I have illustrated above, by limiting Chenery to
questions of fact and not applying it to questions of law, the
Federal Circuit has introduced inconsistency in its
application. Of course, it is not unique to patent law or the
Federal Circuit that identifying an issue as one of law or fact
is a difficult task or one that is susceptible to manipulation.
Ambiguities similar to those I highlight here will also appear
in other courts that make a distinction between law and fact
when deciding whether to apply Chenery.
Indeed, the
potential for this problem can be seen in interpretations of
the original situation in Chenery itself. While most courts
and scholars describe the SEC’s error as one of law,176 the
error has also been reframed more narrowly as one of fact. In
Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, the Eighth Circuit focused on the
agency’s lack of subsidiary factual findings “with regard to
misuse of the fiduciary position, honesty, fair dealings or fair
the “transverse members” in Buff were in fact legs. Because these legs did not
have the offsets required in Skvorecz’s claims, the Buff patent did not anticipate
the claims. Id. at 1267–68.
172. Id. The PTO argued that the language of Skvorecz’s claim could be
construed such that not all legs were required to have an offset: “[C]laim 1 is
anticipated because it can be construed to include wire legs without offsets,
because the claim uses the open-ended transition term ‘comprising.’ ” Id.
173. However, the court rejected the argument on the merits. Id. at 1268.
174. See id. at 1267 n.2.
175. It could be argued that because the finding of anticipation had already
been made by the Board, albeit on a different basis, the finding of fact in
Skvorecz was not a new finding of fact, and therefore was not barred by
Chenery. That argument conflicts with the purposes of Chenery, however, see
infra Part III.A, since the Board’s finding of anticipation was based on a
misunderstanding of the other patent.
176. See, e.g., Stack, supra note 4, at 964 (“Nor have courts cabined Chenery’s
application to the particular deficiency at issue in Chenery—agency reliance on
a legal error.”).
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pricing,”177 instead of describing the agency’s error as an
erroneous legal conclusion. That said, these problems of
framing are exacerbated in patent law by the especially
complicated nature of the distinction between law and fact.
2. Inconsistency Due to Identification of the Relevant
Issue
In addition to the unpredictability in Chenery’s
application due to whether questions are framed more
generally or specifically, the Federal Circuit’s opinions reveal
another troubling inconsistency: they seem to disagree on
what the dispositive issue is. The Federal Circuit has
described the relevant issue—that is, the issue that must be
identified as one of law or of fact—as both the determination
at the agency level and as the potential alternative reasoning
on which the Federal Circuit might affirm the decision.
This difference is an important one. Suppose that the
PTO rejected a claim for a reason that was unambiguously a
question of fact. Then, on appeal, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the PTO was wrong on the finding of fact, but
the court had an alternative rationale that was clearly a
question of law to affirm the rejection. Would Chenery apply
because the original error was a question of fact? Or would
Chenery not apply because the Federal Circuit’s alternative
rationale was a question of law?
In this scenario, most of the Federal Circuit’s opinions
point to the alternative rationale as the relevant issue for
deciding if Chenery applies. In Killip v. Office of Personnel
Management, the Federal Circuit stated that it could affirm
on grounds not relied upon by the agency “when upholding
the Board’s decision does not depend upon making a
determination of fact not previously made by the Board.”178
This approach focuses on the potential alternative rationale
for affirmance. Similar is In re Comiskey, where the Federal
Circuit held that Chenery did not restrict its ability to affirm
the rejection on a different basis—patentable subject
matter—because “ ‘ whether the asserted claims . . . are
invalid for failure to claim statutory subject matter under 35
177. Ark. AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1440 (8th Cir. 1993).
178. Killip v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 991 F.2d 1564, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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U.S.C. § 101, is a question of law.’ ”179 There the court focused
not on the error the PTO made, but on the new reasoning
being proposed to affirm the decision. The court took a
similar approach in In re Skvorecz, where the court said that
Chenery did not apply because the post hoc rationalization
provided by the PTO—claim construction—was a matter of
law.180
Yet the Federal Circuit has also taken the opposite
approach, focusing instead on the PTO’s error as the
dispositive question for the law/fact distinction. In In re
POD-NERS, the court clearly rested its reasoning on the
error by the agency in concluding that Chenery did not
restrict its ability to supply a new reason for affirmance.181 It
stated: “In ruling that the claims would have been obvious,
the Board did not explain its conclusions in detail. It did,
however, unequivocally hold the claims to be obvious, which
was a legal determination. In these circumstances, [SEC v.
Chenery] does not preclude us from affirming the Board”
because “the agency decision was on a legal issue and did not
involve any exercise of its expert discretion.”182
The importance of consistency in identifying the relevant
issue can be seen in the situation presented in In re
Aoyama.183 There, the Board rejected two claims based on
anticipation.184 The Federal Circuit stated that the claims
179. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting AT&T Corp.
v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
180. In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1267 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The Federal
Circuit also took this approach in In re Aoyama, discussed in notes 183–188
infra and the accompanying text.
181. In re POD-NERS, L.L.C., 337 Fed. Appx. 901, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per
curiam).
182. Id. The Federal Circuit similarly implied that the error was dispositive
in In re Thrift, where it said that “[h]ere the Chenery rule is implicated because
the Board failed to provide an adequate ground for sustaining the rejection.” In
re Thrift, 298 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). There, however, the court did
not make the limitation to questions of fact explicit. The Eighth Circuit also
pointed to the agency error as being dispositive in HealthEast Bethesda
Lutheran Hospital and Rehabilitation Center v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 415 (8th Cir.
1998). The court stated that the ability of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to make a new legal argument before the court for the agency’s decision
was not barred because “[t]he case before us does not involve an alleged failure
on the part of the Secretary to make a necessary finding of fact or policy.” Id. at
418.
183. In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
184. Id. at 1294.
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were not anticipated, but instead, they were invalid because
they were indefinite.185 Whereas anticipation is a question of
fact, indefiniteness is a question of law.186 Should Chenery
apply in this case? The Federal Circuit did not end up
applying Chenery; it said that indefiniteness (the new reason
for affirmance) was a question of law, and therefore concluded
that Chenery did not apply.187 But if the court had instead
looked to the agency error, Chenery would have applied, and
the Federal Circuit would have been forced to vacate and
Of course, in many cases, inconsistency in
remand.188
identifying the relevant issue has no practical effect because
both the agency determination and the court’s alternative are
questions of law, or both are questions of fact.189 But in cases
185. Id. at 1298. Patent claims are required to be “definite” under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112. In order to be definite, “ ‘one skilled in the art [must] understand the
bounds of the claim when read in light of the specification.’ ” Personalized
Media Commc’ns, L.L.C. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 705 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (quoting Miles Labs., Inc. v. Shandon, Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir.
1993)).
186. See Aoyama, 656 F.3d at 1296; Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 702.
187. See Aoyama, 656 F.3d at 1299.
188. Actually, in this case, had the court looked to the agency’s error, it
would have implicated a level-of-generality question: the Board incorrectly
found the claim anticipated (a question of fact) because it incorrectly construed
the claims (a question of law). See id. at 1294.
189. This was true in the Zurko litigation, which I discussed earlier in Part
II.B, on remand from the Supreme Court. In re Zurko (Zurko IV), 258 F.3d 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2001). There, the examiner rejected the claims as obvious, and the
Board affirmed the rejection. The examiner and Board relied on two references,
finding that they either inherently or implicitly disclosed a particular limitation
of the applicant’s claims. Id. at 1384. Before the Federal Circuit, the
Commissioner conceded that neither of the references relied upon by the agency
actually disclosed the limitation. Id. at 1385. (The Federal Circuit had
previously held the limitation was not disclosed in the references when the case
was before the court in Zurko I. Zurko I, 111 F.3d 887, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
The Commissioner argued instead that the limitation could be found in four
other pieces of prior art in the record. Therefore, the Commission argued, the
Federal Circuit could affirm the presence of the limitation in the prior art, and
in turn the obviousness of the claims, based on these other references. The
Federal Circuit responded by refusing to affirm the rejection based on the other
references because of Chenery. In this case, the Commissioner attempted to fix
the cited references’ failure to disclose the relevant limitation (a question of
fact) by pointing to other references with that limitation (also a question of fact).
See Zurko IV, 258 F.3d at 1385. Viewed at a broader level, the Commissioner
attempted to fix a flawed obviousness rejection (a question of law) with a valid
obviousness rejection (also a question of law). Whether or not Chenery applied
did not depend, therefore, on whether the court focused on the error or the
suggested solution, as long as it viewed the error and the solution at consistent
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like Aoyama, where the error and the suggested solution do
not fall on the same side of the law/fact divide, the Federal
Circuit’s inconsistency in identifying the relevant question
adds to the unpredictability of whether the court will apply
Chenery.190
III. TOWARD A BETTER CHENERY
So far, I have highlighted two sources of ambiguities in
the Chenery doctrine.
The resulting inconsistency in
Chenery’s
application
undermines
the
quality
of
decisionmaking in initial agency determinations and appeals.
During agency decisionmaking, uncertainty about the
doctrine’s scope can lead to wasted resources through
development of records that are unnecessarily detailed or
that set out unnecessary alternative rationales to avoid
remand. During appeals, unpredictable tests for Chenery’s
application can lead to uncertainly amongst litigants
regarding the acceptable scope of argument.
More fundamentally, uncertainty in the application of
Chenery is troubling because it undermines one of the
primary functions of the doctrine. Chenery mediates the
separation of powers between the judicial and executive
branches when courts review agency action.
If the
levels of generality.
190. It is likely that there is even more inconsistency than I have outlined
here. I have only compared those cases where the Federal Circuit’s majority
opinion applied Chenery or explicitly chose not to apply it. There may be more
inconsistency if the court is not applying (or discussing) Chenery in cases where
it should be applied. Indeed, there have been a number of Federal Circuit cases
where the dissent has critiqued the court’s decision as disregarding Chenery.
See, e.g., Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Gajarsa, J.,
dissenting) (stating, in an appeal from an interference proceeding, “[a]lthough
the majority opinion traces through a very unclear Board decision and tries
with a substantial degree of specificity to supply a reasoned basis for the
Board’s decision, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because there
is no reasoned basis for the Board’s decision and there is no substantial
evidence to support the PTO’s finding of obviousness,” citing Chenery). For
examples in non-patent Federal Circuit cases, see Turman-Kent v. Merit
Systems Protection Board, 657 F.3d 1280, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Reyna, J.,
dissenting), Carley v. Department of the Army, 413 F.3d 1354, 1359–60 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (Newman, J., dissenting), Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. United States,
424 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Dyk, J., dissenting in part), Novosteel SA
v. United States, 284 F.3d 1261, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Dyk, J., dissenting in
part), and Maxima Corp. v. United States, 847 F.2d 1549, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(Nies, J., dissenting).
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application of Chenery is unpredictable or manipulable,
courts will have greater control over when they defer to
agency reasoning, and when they will instead substitute their
own. This leads to a significant danger of court encroachment
on the power that Congress has delegated to agencies.
While this concern applies across administrative law, it is
particularly acute in the context of the Federal Circuit’s
review of PTO decisions. Even after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Zurko, the Federal Circuit has continued to resist
giving the agency the deference typically accorded to agencies
under standard administrative law.191 For instance, the
Federal Circuit gives PTO legal determinations no deference
at all,192 although under standard administrative law
principles, it should give at least Skidmore deference.193
Scholars have also noted other contexts, besides Chenery, in
which the Federal Circuit manipulates the divide between
law and fact to minimize deference to the PTO. By treating
questions of mixed law and fact as questions of pure law, the
court avoids applying the more deferential standard of review
that applies to judicial review of questions of fact.194
Given the Federal Circuit’s divergence from standard
administrative law principles in ways that minimize
deference to the PTO, we should be particularly wary of
ambiguities in Chenery’s application.
With significant
flexibility in whether it will apply Chenery or not, the Federal
191. See Kumar, supra note 5, at 232, 258–69; Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts
and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1052, 1055 (2003) (arguing that Dickinson v. Zurko will
have “some impact” on Federal Circuit review of questions the court
acknowledges as factual, but “it will have no impact on review in the many
cases . . . in which the Federal Circuit refuses to recognize the existence of
factual disputes,” and pointing to the court’s “continued resistance to
deference”).
192. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
193. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 300; infra note 263.
194. See Kumar, supra note 5, at 264–67; cf. Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial
Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877 (2002)
(discussing, in the context of review of district court decisions, the Federal
Circuit’s “alchemy” of making fact-dependent inquiries into questions of pure
law, particularly in claim construction—which applies equally well to the
Federal Circuit’s review of the PTO). Professor Rai also argues that the Federal
Circuit has shown resistance even to deference to PTO factual determinations.
She argues that in Zurko IV, after the Supreme Court mandated review under
the APA standards, the Federal Circuit in effect refused to apply the correct
standard. See Rai, supra note 191, at 1056.
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Circuit can quietly usurp power from the agency. In contrast
to the more transparent reduction in deference to the agency
when the Federal Circuit openly narrows Chenery’s scope to
questions of fact, flexibility in how the court applies its
declared rule is a subtle but insidious threat.
In the following sections, I consider a number of ways
that the Federal Circuit’s application of Chenery could be
improved.
My first goal is to explore how Chenery’s
application can be made more uniform and predictable.
Uniformity in applying Chenery is the first step in protecting
the agency’s congressionally delegated power.
Beyond
uniformity, however, my exploration of different alternatives
also addresses the validity of the Federal Circuit’s narrow
interpretation of Chenery’s scope, as well as whether a
broader or even narrower Chenery doctrine would be
normatively desirable or doctrinally permissible.
A. Benefits and Costs of the Chenery Doctrine
In assessing how the ambiguities in Chenery’s application
ought to be resolved, it is important to consider the benefits
and costs of the Chenery doctrine in administrative law
generally, and how persuasively they apply to review of PTO
decisions.
1. In Administrative Law Generally
In administrative law generally, the benefits attributed
to Chenery can be grouped into two categories: preserving the
power of agencies and leading to better decisions.
i.

The Benefit of Preserving an Agency’s Power

Chenery plays a role in preserving the power delegated to
agencies by Congress. Chenery protects the agency’s power
from two potential intruders. First, Chenery prevents courts
from infringing on the power delegated to agencies. In
Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, the U.S. Supreme
Court explained that the purpose of the Chenery doctrine “is
not to deprecate, but to vindicate, the administrative process,
for the purpose of the rule is to avoid ‘propel[ling] the court
into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for
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the administrative agency.’ ”195 Relying on a court-supplied
rationale may allow affirmance of an agency’s decision in one
instance. But in the long term it may encroach on an
agency’s power because “reasons have greater generality than
the outcomes they support.”196 Thus, a reason supplied in one
case may lead to particular outcomes in another.197
Second, Chenery prevents the lawyers within an agency
from infringing on the power delegated to the agency as a
whole.198 Without Chenery, an agency’s lawyers would have
significant control over the development of the agency’s
decisionmaking because in litigation they would be able to
formulate post hoc rationales before the reviewing court.199
The result would be similar to allowing court-supplied
rationales for affirmance; while it would benefit the agency in
a single case, it might ultimately diminish the influence of
the decisions reached in the normal course of agency
decisionmaking by more technically trained agency experts.200
ii. The Benefit of Better Agency Decisionmaking
Chenery can also lead to better agency decisionmaking by
influencing both who must provide rationales for decisions
and when those rationales must be provided.201 Both effects
may lead to better decisions. A classic justification for the
administrative state is that agencies are delegated power by
Congress because they are better suited, as experts, to make
decisions in complicated or technical areas.202 Just as agency
decisionmakers are presumed to be better than Congress at
making these decisions, they may also make better decisions
than more generalist courts or lawyers within the agency.203
195. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 169 (1962)
(citing Chenery II, 322 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (citation omitted)).
196. Stack, supra note 4, at 997; see id. 997–1000.
197. See Stack, supra note 4, at 997–1000.
198. See Krent, supra note 3, at 200; Stack, supra note 4, at 993.
199. See Stack, supra note 4, at 993–94.
200. See Krent, supra note 3, at 199–200.
201. See Stack, supra note 4, at 961.
202. See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938),
which is described in Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private
Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91
VA. L. REV. 93, 127 n.111 (2005), as the “classic statement” of the agency
expertise justification.
203. It is for this reason that some judges and scholars advocate that courts
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If agencies have the expertise to be better decisionmakers
than generalists, agencies might be better at formulating the
right rationales as well. Holding agencies accountable by
requiring them to provide the rationales for decisions, rather
than having courts or lawyers provide them, may also result
in better decisions because it increases political
accountability204 and because it limits an agency’s power to
make decisions without public scrutiny.205
Chenery may also lead to better decisionmaking by
requiring agencies to articulate rationales when a decision is
made, rather than allowing post hoc rationalization. On the
front end, this encourages agencies to think through their
reasoning thoroughly before making a decision,206 since they
(or their lawyers) cannot rely on formulating convincing
arguments if and when an appeal forces them to do so after
the agency’s decision is made. On the back end, Chenery
allows for better quality-control, since a requirement that
rationales be set forth in the record allows judges to check
agency decisions more effectively.207 Moreover, using a post
hoc rationale not on the agency record to affirm an agency
decision denies interested third parties the opportunity to
challenge the new rationale before the agency. Remand
because of Chenery, on the other hand, forces agencies to
reopen the proceedings and reconsider the issue, allowing
interested parties to have their voices heard.208

should scrutinize the procedural mechanisms by which agencies make decisions,
but they should not scrutinize the underlying substance on which courts are not
experts. See Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (“[I]n cases of great technological complexity, the
best way for courts to guard against unreasonable or erroneous administrative
decisions is not for the judges themselves to scrutinize the technical merits of
each decision. Rather, it is to establish a decision-making process that assures
a reasoned decision . . . .”).
204. See Stack, supra note 4, at 993–96.
205. See Krent, supra note 3, at 198; Stack, supra note 4, at 995–96.
206. See Friendly, supra note 5, at 208–09; Stack, supra note 4, at 957–58.
207. See Krent, supra note 3, at 199; cf. Stack, supra note 4, at 999–1000
(suggesting that Chenery restricts the domain of reasons a court can consider,
making “review more manageable”).
208. See Krent, supra note 3, at 198–99.
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iii. Chenery’s Costs
There are, however, significant costs to applying Chenery.
It increases the resources that agencies expend in making
decisions, since it creates a systematic incentive for agencies
to formulate longer and more thorough explanations for each
decision.209 If the decisions are still found insufficient under
Chenery and a court remands the case back to the agency,
this imposes further costs upon the agency (and the court
system if the case returns on appeal).210 These effects
significantly increase burdens on agencies, leading some
scholars to describe Chenery as contributing to the
“ossification” of the administrative state.211
2. As Applied to Review of PTO Decisions
To what extent do these benefits and costs of Chenery
influence the answer to the normative question of how it
should be applied in the specific context of reviewing patent
denials?
i.

The Benefit of Protecting an Agency’s Power

Some of Chenery’s benefits may be less pronounced in the
review of PTO decisions as compared to other agency
contexts. In particular, the benefit of protecting the agency’s
power from lawyers and courts may be less persuasive
because Congress has delegated significantly less power to
the PTO than to many other agencies. The PTO does not
have general substantive rulemaking authority.212 To the
extent that Chenery is best “justified as an incident of
delegation,”213 then, the doctrine may apply less forcefully to
the PTO. Further, if Chenery is important because “reasons
209. Stack, supra note 4, at 971, 973.
210. Id. at 973.
211. See, e.g., id. at 971, 972 n.86, 973.
212. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 298. But the PTO does have broader
procedural rulemaking authority, as well as substantive rulemaking authority,
in a few areas. Id. at 297–98. See generally Joseph Scott Miller, Substance,
Procedure, and the Divided Patent Power, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 31 (2011)
(discussing the PTO’s rulemaking power and the uncertain line between
substantive and procedural power). It also issues guidelines and policy
statements, which are less formal rules that do not technically bind patent
applicants. Id. at 63–64.
213. Stack, supra note 4, at 1004.
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have greater generality than the outcomes they support,”214
this effect is not likely to infringe on the PTO’s delegated
power if the PTO does not have substantive rulemaking
authority in the first place. Notwithstanding the PTO’s lack
of substantive rulemaking authority, however, Chenery can
still play a role in protecting the PTO’s explicitly delegated
authority to administer the Patent Act through the
adjudication of individual patent applications.215
Yet, even if the PTO has power to be protected by
Chenery, the agency may only seldom exercise that power to
make the types of decisions in which allowing courts or
lawyers to supply post hoc rationales would considerably
diminish agency control. Most PTO decisions do not have
significant implications for future policies or patent
adjudications. One reason is that the vast majority of Board
decisions do not chart new doctrinal territory, and indeed, are
designated as nonprecedential.216 Because denials of patent
applications are generally based on a limited and recurring
set of reasons—obviousness, anticipation, etc.—the benefit to
the PTO of articulating the rationales may be minimal.
Moreover, the adjudication of each patent application is
highly fact-specific, so in most cases, the decision on any one
application is not particularly likely to be relevant to the
decision on another.
On the other hand, a number of Board decisions have
introduced new interpretations of the law and are designated
as precedential for future Board decisions.217 Moreover,
214. Id. at 997; see supra text accompanying notes 196–197.
215. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(1) (West 2012) (“The [PTO] . . . shall be
responsible for the granting and issuing of patents . . . .”). Professor Stack
suggests that the nondelegation argument for Chenery is most persuasive in the
context of rulemaking, not adjudication.
However, he concludes that
nondelegation justifies Chenery in adjudication because, under another
principle articulated in Chenery II, agencies have discretion whether to proceed
via rulemaking or adjudication. Stack, supra note 4, at 1012. That the PTO
does not have this discretion to proceed via either approach may be another
reason the nondelegation justification is not a persuasive one in patent law.
216. See BD. OF PATENT APPEALS & INTERFERENCES, STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURE 2 (REVISION 7), PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS AND BINDING
PRECEDENT 1, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/sop2.pdf
(“The Board annually issues a large number of opinions in appeals . . . . Most
opinions do not add significantly to the body of law.”).
217. See id. at 2–3 (identifying the criteria for Board decisions to be made
precedential).
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scholars have argued that the PTO exercises its discretion
and makes policy decisions to a greater degree than the
Federal Circuit acknowledges. Professors Benjamin and Rai
have criticized the Federal Circuit for failing to recognize
policy decisions as a separate type of PTO decisionmaking,218
and Professor Kumar has argued that it is hard to
understand how the Federal Circuit can fail to recognize that
decisions regarding patentable subject matter involve
policy.219 Thus, the potential benefits of Chenery may be
greater than initial appearances would suggest.
ii. The Benefit of Better Agency Decisionmaking
The idea that Chenery can improve agency
decisionmaking by requiring articulated rationales has mixed
applicability to PTO decisions. As for who articulates the
rationales, PTO examiners and administrative law judges are
particularly good examples of technically trained experts
making decisions in an area where lay judges and lawyers are
significantly less qualified.220 This is particularly true for
findings of fact.221
Some of this expertise-based argument may be tempered
by the expertise that the Federal Circuit gains through its
exclusive jurisdiction in appeals from PTO patent denials.222
This exclusive jurisdiction—combined with the court’s
exclusive jurisdiction in appeals of district court patent
218. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 305–08.
219. See Kumar, supra note 5, at 272–73.
220. Cf. Nard, supra note 63, at 1471–72 (suggesting that the relative
expertise of the PTO as compared to the Federal Circuit is relatively greater
than that of the other agencies whose decisions the Federal Circuit reviews). All
patent examiners have a technical undergraduate degree, and many have
higher degrees. Id. at 1506. Many of the administrative judges on the Board
are former senior patent examiners, Gechter v. Davidson, 116 F.3d 1454, 1459
(Fed. Cir. 1997), and all are required to be “persons of competent legal
knowledge and scientific ability.” 35 U.S.C.A. § 6 (West 2012). In contrast,
there is no such requirement for judges on the Federal Circuit. Four of the ten
active judges in 2012 had a technical degree. Kumar, supra note 5, at 246.
221. For those issues that the Federal Circuit has labeled ones of law, but
that are in fact highly fact-intensive, agency decisionmakers’ expertise is still
extremely valuable. See supra note 194 and accompanying text; cf. Rai, supra
note 194, at 881–82 (discussing how, although claim construction is a question
of law, judges are unlikely to be able to correctly interpret the language, and in
most cases, “would be well-advised to turn to the testimony of experts”).
222. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (West 2012).
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infringement cases223—allows the Federal Circuit to develop
more expertise in patent law than appellate courts typically
have in any particular area of substantive law.224 Greater
expertise in appellate review diminishes the benefit of having
the agency, rather than the court, formulate rationales, thus
making Chenery less important. But the Federal Circuit’s
technological expertise still generally falls well short of the
agency’s expertise. Chenery’s effect of having rationales
developed by agency experts thus remains a powerful reason
for Chenery in review of PTO decisionmaking.225
As for when rationales are articulated, Chenery probably
has little effect. The official guidelines for patent examiners,
in editions published prior to either of the Supreme Court’s
two Chenery decisions, dictated that a patent examiner
describe his reasons for rejection and support them with
specific references.226 Thus, the PTO practice of articulating
the reasoning behind its decisions was in place well before
Chenery, at least at the examiner level. Chenery is therefore
unlikely to be a major force in encouraging the PTO to
articulate its basic rationales during agency proceedings,
though it may encourage the Board to be more thorough and
clear in its opinions. The already existing practice of
providing applicants with the rationales behind decisions also
suggests that Chenery has limited benefit as far as making
agency reasoning open to public scrutiny. In addition,
because patent adjudication is an ex parte process,227
remanding to the agency to reopen proceedings does not, for
the most part, have the benefit of allowing more interested
parties to challenge the reasoning.228
223. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(1) (West 2012).
224. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40
(1997) (referring to the Federal Circuit’s “special expertise” in an appeal of a
patent infringement case).
225. Cf. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 313–16 (discussing the relative
expertise of the PTO and Federal Circuit).
226. C.L. WOLCOTT, MANUAL OF PATENT OFFICE PROCEDURE 48–60 (7th ed.,
1936) (describing proper procedures for the examiner’s letter of decision).
227. Dennis M. de Guzman, In re Epstein: A Case of Patent Hearsay, 70
WASH. L. REV. 805, 809 (1995).
228. Remanding does, however, allow the applicant to address a new
rationale for the rejection. If the Federal Circuit affirms a rejection on a ground
not relied upon by the agency, the applicant loses the ability to amend his
application in consideration of the rejection or to submit new evidence to
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iii. Chenery’s Costs
The PTO’s established process for adjudication of patent
applications also means that applying Chenery may not add a
significant burden.
The PTO is certainly severely
backlogged—in 2012, over 1.2 million applications were
pending.229 The average time from filing a notice of appeal to
the Board until a decision was approximately three years,230
with over twenty-six thousand pending appeals of patent
applications.231 Chenery imposes direct costs on this system,
since the Federal Circuit adds to the agency’s backlog when it
remands a case rather than affirming it. But the indirect
costs attributable to Chenery may be less than they could be.
The examiner is already required, without regard to Chenery,
to articulate her reasoning, so applying the doctrine may not
significantly increase the time spent on each application in
the first instance. Application of Chenery may, however,
counteract pressures on the PTO to decrease its application
backlog by cutting down the time examiners spend on each
application, and it may force the Board to write more
thorough opinions than it might otherwise.232
overcome the rejection. In recognition of this risk when Chenery does not bar
the new rationale, the Federal Circuit has affirmed on a new ground and then
still remanded to the PTO to afford the applicant these protections. See In re
Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967,
981–82 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The dissent in Aoyama argued that these protections
were insufficient. See Aoyama, 656 F.3d at 1301 (Newman, J., dissenting).
There are also some ways for third parties to challenge the patentability of a
patent application. For instance, members of the public can file protests against
pending applications, see U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 134, at Ch. 1900, and requests for
reexamination. See id. §§ 2203, 2612. The America Invents Act also added a
new provision for third party submissions. See Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act, Pub. L. 112-29, § 8, 125 Stat. 284, 315–16 (2011).
229. U.S.
PATENT
&
TRADEMARK
OFFICE,
PERFORMANCE
AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 178 tbl.5 (2012), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2012PAR.pdf.
230. FY 2012 Performance Measures, USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov
/ip/boards/bpai/stats/perform/fy2012_perform.jsp (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
231. FY 2012 Process Production Report, USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov
/ip/boards/bpai/stats/process/fy2012_sep_b.jsp (last visited Jan. 15, 2013)
(indicating that at the end of fiscal year 2012, there were 26,484 pending
appeals of patent applications, not including appeals of ex parte or inter partes
reexaminations).
232. Indeed, there is some evidence that the Board is addressing its backlog
by writing less detailed opinions. See Dennis Crouch, Today’s Study: The
BPAI’s Response to Its Backlog, PATENTLYO.COM, http://www.patentlyo.com

MOTOMURA FINAL

866

8/22/2013 3:56 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

The added costs of Chenery may also be less in PTO
decisionmaking for the same reason that Chenery might not
have a large effect on the quality of decisionmaking. The
PTO does not primarily make the type of decisions on which
Chenery is thought to impose a large burden.
The
burdensome effects of Chenery have been most criticized in
the context of the “hard look” doctrine.233 Under “hard look”
review, courts closely scrutinize agency regulatory policy
decisions, checking whether an agency considered all the
factors Congress intended it to consider, did not consider
inappropriate factors, made a decision supported by the
evidence in front of it, and explained why every other viable
alternative was not pursued.234 In contrast, most of the PTO’s
patent adjudications involve a limited scope of considerations
and possible outcomes, and its decisions are rarely recognized
as policy decisions or as involving exercises of discretion that
would require hard look review.235 That said, because the
PTO may exercise its discretion more than the Federal
Circuit recognizes,236 there may in fact be more situations
where Chenery could be a burden.
iv. Chenery’s Role in Mediating Power Between the
Federal Circuit and the PTO
More broadly, Chenery’s scope affects the Federal
Circuit’s power to shape the development of substantive
patent law. In re Comiskey is one of the best illustrations of
this effect. Recall that in Comiskey, the PTO rejected the
application’s claims on obviousness grounds, but the Federal
/patent/2011/03/jason-rantanen-has-written-several-recent-posts-on-rule-36affirmancesin-those-cases-the-federal-circuitsimplyaffirms-the-l.html (counting
the number of words in each published ex parte merits decision by the Board in
February 2009, January 2010, and January 2011, and finding that the mean
number of words dropped from approximately 3,000 words per opinion in 2009
to 2,000 words per opinion in 2011, and that the median number of words in
2009 was sixty percent more than the number in 2011, and finding that
controlling for other variables did not reduce the effect).
233. See Stack, supra note 4, at 972; see also Note, Rationalizing Hard Look
Review After the Fact, supra note 5, at 1913.
234. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); Note, Rationalizing Hard Look Review
After the Fact, supra note 5, at 1913–14.
235. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 305–06.
236. See supra notes 218–219 and accompanying text.
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Circuit upheld the rejection based on unpatentable subject
Professor Eisenberg has suggested that the
matter.237
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in an earlier case
involving patentable subject matter238 put the Federal Circuit
on notice: after a long period of not interfering with the
Federal Circuit’s broad interpretation of patentable subject
matter, the Supreme Court might be entering the arena.239
Professor Eisenberg describes the Federal Circuit’s request
for supplemental briefing and affirmance on patentable
subject matter as reflecting the court’s “eager[ness] for an
opportunity to address the issue of patentable subject matter
ahead of the Supreme Court”240 during a period of uncertainty
about the scope of patentable subject matter. Limiting
Chenery to questions of fact allowed the Federal Circuit to
enter the patentable subject matter debate, even though the
issue had not come up at the agency below. As a result, the
Federal Circuit could shape substantive patent law without
the involvement of the PTO. If Chenery had applied, the
power to raise the issue would have remained in the first
instance with the PTO.241
To the extent that a desire for greater uniformity in
patent law motivated the Federal Circuit’s creation,242
237. See supra text accompanying notes 154–158.
238. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 546 U.S. 975
(2005). There, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
claims to a method of diagnosing a vitamin deficiency covered patentable
subject matter. The writ of certiorari was later dismissed as improvidently
granted. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125
(2006).
239. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand Control?
Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods After In re Bilski, 3 CASE W.
RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 13 (2012).
240. Id.
241. Of course, the Federal Circuit also shapes substantive patent law
through appeals from district court decisions involving issued patents. So even
if Chenery significantly limited the Federal Circuit’s power in appeals from the
agency, because appellate courts can affirm district court decisions on grounds
not articulated by the lower court, see Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245
(1937), the Federal Circuit’s power would still be considerable.
242. Before the Federal Circuit was created in 1982, district court patent
cases could be appealed to the regional circuit court. Christopher A. Cotropia,
Determining Uniformity Within the Federal Circuit by Measuring Dissent and
En Banc Review, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 804 (2010). This system contributed
to two perceived problems: the regional circuits’ dockets were overcrowded, and
there was significant variation in patent law among the circuits, as well as
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Chenery thus seems to stand in the way.243 On the other
hand, it is not clear that the Federal Circuit’s mandate
justifies intrusion into the congressional delegation of patent
adjudication to the PTO. The congressional mandate was
largely intended to shift power over patent law from the
regional circuits to the Federal Circuit—not away from the
PTO.244 Indeed, Professor Kumar has criticized the Federal
Circuit’s “heavy-handed review” in Comiskey as violating the
separation of powers by intruding upon the power granted to
the PTO by Congress. She argues that such review transfers
power from a politically accountable agency to a court whose
decisions are insulated from review except by the Supreme
Court.245
I believe, however, that it is not entirely clear that a
narrow Chenery doctrine per se violates the separation of
powers as applied to the PTO. The PTO has significantly less
power than many other agencies, particularly in that it lacks
substantive rulemaking power and receives less deference on
legal determinations than other agencies.246 As such, it may
not warrant the full range of protection that Chenery typically
provides agencies, as I discuss in more detail below.247 But it
is more clear that when Chenery’s ambiguities allow the court
to manipulate the doctrine to further minimize deference,
that violates the separation of powers. I therefore turn next
to several possible ways to reduce the unpredictable and
manipulable aspects of applying Chenery. Because most of
between the circuit courts, the CCPA, and the PTO. There was widespread
forum shopping and significant uncertainty in how different forums would
adjudicate the rights of patent owners. Id. at 805; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
The Federal Circuit as an Institution: What Ought We to Expect?, 43 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 827, 828 (2010).
243. Cf. Kumar, supra note 5, at 273 (“The In re Comiskey decision has
arguably allowed the Federal Circuit to maintain uniformity in patent law.”).
244. Cf. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1989) (describing the problems
motivating the Federal Circuit’s creation: (1) that the PTO and Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals could develop their own views of patent law, but
could not impose them on the other courts; (2) that patent law varied widely
across the circuits, leading to rampant forum shopping and uncertainty about
the value of a patent; and (3) overloaded dockets in appellate courts).
245. See Kumar, supra note 5, at 273–74.
246. See infra text accompanying notes 271–277 (discussing how legal
determinations in patent denials do not receive Chevron deference).
247. See infra Part III.B.2.

MOTOMURA FINAL

2013]

8/22/2013 3:56 PM

RETHINKING THE CHENERY DOCTRINE

869

these approaches involve adjusting Chenery’s scope, in
discussing them, I also explore just how much protection
under Chenery PTO decisions should receive given both
doctrinal constraints and normative goals.
B. Increasing the Predictability of Chenery’s Application
In the following sections, I address two types of
approaches to achieving greater predictability in Chenery’s
application.
The first type would minimize the
inconsistencies that arise due to the Federal Circuit’s rule for
Chenery’s
application
relying
on
unpredictable
characterization of the relevant issue as law or fact. One
such solution would be to eliminate the need for line-drawing
by either never or always applying Chenery, regardless of
whether the question is one of law or fact. An alternative
solution of this type would be to clarify both the dispositive
question and how to characterize it as law or fact. A second
type of approach would break down the Chenery doctrine into
its different functions, rather than rely on the distinction
between law and fact. I ultimately conclude that solutions of
the second type are best aligned with the underlying purposes
of Chenery and existing administrative law doctrine.
1. Narrowing Chenery’s Scope
The application of Chenery might be made more
consistent by eliminating the need for line-drawing by either
never applying Chenery, or always applying it, regardless of
whether the question is one of law or fact. I first consider not
applying it at all. Of course, in the context of most agency
decisions, never applying Chenery would obviously contradict
Supreme Court precedent. But is there an argument that the
PTO is different?
In the context of the PTO, adopting this approach would
allow the Federal Circuit to affirm the PTO’s decision on any
rationale supported by the record, regardless of whether the
agency had articulated that rationale. The approach would
likely be permissible as a matter of statutory authority. The
patent statutes themselves do not require that Chenery be
applied. Under 35 U.S.C. § 144, the Federal Circuit must
review PTO decisions on appeal based on “the record before
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the Patent and Trademark Office.”248 Reviewing “on the
record” simply means that the review must be based on the
information in the record; new information cannot be brought
in. The statute does not state that the court’s reasoning must
be restricted to the reasoning relied upon in the record before
the agency.249
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Zurko III,
however, it is unlikely that the Federal Circuit could stop
applying Chenery altogether. Recall from Part II that under
Zurko III, PTO decisions are subject to Federal Circuit review
under the standards for review of administrative agency
action set forth in the APA.250 It is true that Zurko III did not
actually encompass the requirement that Chenery apply to
questions of fact in patent. The Court’s specific holding was
that APA § 706 applies to review of findings of fact, not that
the entire APA scheme applies.251 And even if it had held
that the entire APA scheme applied, it is not clear that this
holding would have encompassed Chenery. Though some
cases have suggested that Chenery has its origins in the
scheme set up by the APA,252 Professor Stack has argued that
Chenery cannot be justified as an APA requirement.253
248. 35 U.S.C.A. § 144 (West 2012).
249. While the record requirement might at first appear to be the same as
Chenery for questions of fact, that is not necessarily the case. For instance,
suppose the Board found the claim to be anticipated (a question of fact) based on
the rationale that patent X disclosed all the limitations (also a question of fact).
Suppose that elsewhere in the record the Board stated that patent Y had all the
limitations of patent X, but the Board did not explicitly rely on patent Y’s
anticipation as a rationale for the finding of anticipation. If the Federal Circuit
found that patent X did not in fact anticipate the claims, but patent Y did, that
rationale for affirming the anticipation rejection would be based entirely on the
record but would not pass muster under Chenery (though a reasonable court
might apply one of the exceptions).
Despite the requirement that the Federal Circuit base its review on the
record, it does not always do so. See William C. Rooklidge & Mathew F. Weil,
Judicial Hyperactivity: The Federal Circuit’s Discomfort with Its Appellate Role,
15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 726 (2000) (discussing how the court sometimes
“lose[s] track of the important distinction between trial and appellate roles”).
250. Zurko III, 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999).
251. Id. at 152.
252. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374
(1998) (citing to Chenery, among other cases, as part of the “scheme of ‘reasoned
decisionmaking’ ” established by the APA); Local Joint Exec. Bd. v. NLRB, 309
F.3d 578, 583 (9th Cir. 2002) (same).
253. See Stack, supra note 4, at 974–75 (arguing that Chenery cannot be
justified as an APA requirement, either based on the APA’s requirement of
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Although the application of Chenery appears to be beyond
the precise holding of the Supreme Court in Zurko III, the
decision has been described as a “symbolic” one.254 The Zurko
III Court emphasized “the importance of maintaining a
uniform approach to judicial review of administrative
action.”255 It would certainly be at odds with Zurko III to
conclude that the PTO is so different from other agencies that
a major principle of administrative law does not apply to it at
all. Such a conclusion would give the Federal Circuit
significantly more power in reviewing the PTO than courts
have in reviewing other agencies, and it would
correspondingly give the PTO much less power than other
agencies. Given Congress’s delegation of power to adjudicate
patent applications to the PTO,256 failing to protect even
factual findings by the PTO on judicial review would seem to
contravene not only Zurko but also congressional intent. It
would also mean losing the benefit of Chenery where that
benefit is likely large—when technically trained experts make
determinations of fact during the patent examination process.
2. Broadening Chenery’s Scope
As an alternative to not applying Chenery, courts might
instead broaden its application to both questions of law and
fact. While the Federal Circuit and a few other courts have
held that Chenery does not apply to questions of law, most
courts and scholars have not considered the doctrine to be so
limited.257 One scholar has argued that the Federal Circuit’s
reason-giving for action or based on the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review).
254. Kerr, supra note 9, at 128.
255. Zurko III, 527 U.S. at 154.
256. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(1) (West 2012) (“The [PTO] . . . shall be
responsible for the granting and issuing of patents . . . .”).
257. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25 (1998) (“If a
reviewing court agrees that the agency misinterpreted the law, it will set aside
the agency’s action and remand the case—even though the agency (like a new
jury after a mistrial) might later, in the exercise of its lawful discretion, reach
the same result for a different reason.” (citing Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 87
(1943))); Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S.
270, 291 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“If the court of appeals finds legal
error, it must remand the case to the agency . . . . This is the lesson of Chenery
and its progeny . . . .”); Bond, supra note 5, at 2158 (“[A] court generally must
remand to an agency if it finds the agency has committed legal error or has
failed to address a material issue.”); Stack, supra note 4, at 965–66, 1008; see
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failure to apply Chenery to questions of law not only
misinterprets Supreme Court precedent but also violates
separation of powers.258 That said, there is a plausible
argument for why the Federal Circuit should not apply
Chenery to PTO determinations of law (though neither the
Federal Circuit, nor any other court declining to apply
Chenery to questions of law, has considered the argument in
its opinions).
The argument for not applying Chenery to PTO
determinations of law stems from Chenery’s relationship with
Chevron deference, which is a form of judicial deference
granted to some agency interpretations of a statute that the
agency administers. Under Chevron, a court determines
whether to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute by
first looking to whether the statute specifically addresses the
precise issue before the agency (“Chevron Step One”).259 If the
statute does not specifically address the issue, the agency’s
interpretation receives deference if the interpretation is
reasonable (“Chevron Step Two”).260 Professor Stack argues,
and courts have held,261 that Chenery applies at Chevron Step
Two. Put differently, Chenery limits what a court considers
in determining whether an agency’s statutory interpretation
is reasonable. Once a court finds in Chevron Step One that
the statute does not unambiguously address the particular
issue, the court must limit its analysis of the reasonableness
of the agency’s interpretation (Chevron Step Two) to the
agency’s articulated reasons for its interpretation.262 This
means that Chenery applies to determinations of law when
the statute is ambiguous.263
also supra text accompanying notes 53–55.
258. See Kumar, supra note 5, at 273.
259. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842–43 (1984).
260. Id. at 843–44.
261. See Bank of Am. v. FDIC, 244 F.3d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Most
. . . decisions apply Chenery during analysis involving Chevron’s second
step . . . . That is the proper place for Chenery considerations to come into
Chevron analysis.”); see, e.g., Am.’s Cmty. Bankers v. FDIC, 200 F.3d 822, 835
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating that the principle of Chenery “applies as well to our
review of statutory interpretations under the second prong of Chevron”).
262. Stack, supra note 4, at 1010.
263. When Chevron deference does not apply to an agency’s interpretation of
a statute, under standard administrative law, the review is not de novo.
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While this broader interpretation of Chenery may work
for most agencies, the problem with extending it to appeals
from the PTO is that PTO decisions do not receive Chevron
In 2001, the Supreme Court significantly
deference.264
limited the application of Chevron as a general matter in its
decision in United States v. Mead Corporation.265 The Court
held that Chevron deference only applies when the agency
has been delegated power to make decisions with the force of
law, and the agency action is an exercise of that authority.266
The Court stated that it “is fair to assume generally” that
Congress has delegated the power to make decisions with the
force of law “when it provides for a relatively formal
Thus, Mead has been
administrative procedure.”267
interpreted as creating a “safe harbor”268 for agency actions
carried out through rulemaking or formal adjudication.269
However, Mead also indicated that informal adjudications
could, at least in theory, merit deference based on a variety of
factors, including the agency’s practices in issuing the
decisions, the precedential value or binding nature of the
decisions, and the terms of the statute delegating authority to

Rather, Skidmore deference applies. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 221 (2001). Under Skidmore, the deference to an agency’s interpretation
“depend[s] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 (1944). Professor Stack has argued that Chenery cannot be applied if only
Skidmore deference is warranted, because, he argues, as an incident of the
nondelegation doctrine, Chenery cannot apply to decisions by an agency that
lack authority to bind with the force of law. See Stack, supra note 4, at 1012.
Whether Chenery applies in Skidmore deference may be a largely academic
question. When a court decides that an agency’s reasoning is sufficiently
persuasive, it adheres to the reasoning, and thus it follows Chenery. When a
court decides the agency’s reasoning is not sufficiently persuasive, it does not
adhere to the reasoning, and thus Chenery cannot apply. Thus, asking whether
Chenery applies seems to add little to asking whether the court will defer under
Skidmore.
264. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 297–99.
265. Mead, 533 U.S. 218. The Federal Circuit did not apply Chevron to PTO
decisions even before Mead limited its scope, see Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d
1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996), though scholars argued that it should. See Nard,
supra note 63, at 1450–65.
266. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.
267. Id. at 229.
268. Id. at 246 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
269. Id. at 229–31 (majority opinion).
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the agency.270
Under current law, PTO legal determinations in patent
denials do not receive Chevron deference.271 Commentators
have argued, however, that they could be. As a starting
point, PTO determinations to grant or deny patents are
informal adjudications, and are thus outside Mead’s safe
harbor.272 In discussing whether Chevron should apply to
PTO legal determinations, Professors Benjamin and Rai
concluded that patent grants are unlikely to merit Chevron
deference because they lack precedential value and are issued
in great numbers by low-level officials.273 But Benjamin and
Rai suggest that patent denials might merit Chevron
deference, since they have gone through more levels of agency
review.274 Denials might also be worthy of Chevron deference
because Board decisions are issued in far fewer numbers than
examiner decisions—under 10,000 decisions in ex parte
appeals per year, as compared to over 500,000 examiner
decisions per year in recent years.275 Moreover, appeals are
decided by panels of three administrative law judges who
issue written opinions,276 and in some cases, the Board
designates the opinions as binding precedent for future Board
decisions because they “add significantly to the body of
law.”277
Following this logic, if patent denials received Chevron
deference, Chenery could be applied to PTO determinations of
law.278 Indeed, Professor Stack argues that if an agency’s
270. Id. at 231–34.
271. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 293–301.
272. Id. at 298–99.
273. Id.
Furthermore, the PTO does not have general substantive
rulemaking authority. Id. at 298.
274. Id. at 298–99, 318.
275. The yearly figures for ex parte appeals of patent applications were 9,912
cases disposed of in fiscal year 2012 and 7,292 in fiscal year 2011. BPAI
Statistics—Process Production Reports, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/stats/process/index.jsp (last visited Jan. 8,
2013). The yearly figures for patent application disposals were 574,854 in 2012
and 533,943 in 2011. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 229, at
175 tbl.1.
276. 35 U.S.C.A. § 6 (West 2012).
277. BD. OF PATENT APPEALS & INTERFERENCES, supra note 216, at 2–3.
278. In this context, determinations of law include the application of fact to
law. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 297 (“Under the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence, Chevron applies both to pure questions of legal interpretation
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interpretive authority receives Chevron deference, it is no
longer doctrinally plausible not to apply Chenery to
interpretations of statutes that the agency administers.279 If
Chevron and Chenery both applied to questions of law, the
Federal Circuit could affirm a PTO decision only on a ground
articulated by the PTO, unless the issue involved an
unambiguous statute. The statute would almost always be
ambiguous in determinations of patent validity. The patent
statutes are rarely clear enough to resolve questions about
whether a claim meets the requirements for validity.280 Thus,
applying Chevron and Chenery to ambiguous interpretations
of law would lead to Chenery’s application in almost all cases
and would add significantly more certainty as to when the
Federal Circuit would apply the Chenery doctrine.
Realistically, however, the Federal Circuit would
certainly resist adopting this view of Chenery and Chevron
without express direction from the Supreme Court, given the
Federal Circuit’s resistance to increased deference to the
Applying both Chenery and Chevron would
PTO.281
dramatically increase the power held by the PTO relative to
the Federal Circuit. The Supreme Court, in turn, almost
certainly would not give such express direction. Though the
Court indicated in Mead that informal adjudication could
receive Chevron deference in theory, the Court has yet to
apply Chevron in such a case.282 Thus, although applying
Chenery to questions of law and fact might resolve the
unpredictability of the Federal Circuit’s application of the
doctrine, it is an unrealistic solution.

and to the interpretation involved in applying legal standards to factual
findings, and nothing in Mead suggests a differentiation between pure and
applied interpretations.”).
279. See Stack, supra note 4, at 1008.
280. Cf. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 297 (describing how the PTO is
similar to other agencies in that the organic statute does not speak precisely to
the question at issue, and allows for legal interpretation).
281. See supra notes 191–194 and accompanying text.
282. Cf. Thomas Moore, Note, Abandoning Mead: Why Informal
Adjudications Should Only Receive Minimal Deference in Federal Courts, 2008
UTAH L. REV. 719 (2008) (describing the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance on
how to apply Mead to informal adjudications, and circuit courts’ inconsistent
decisions as a result).
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3. Clarifying the Question and the Proper Level of
Generality
If current doctrine dictates that Chenery apply neither
never nor always, one way to address the uncertainty of its
application, without changing the Federal Circuit’s rule that
Chenery applies to issues of fact but not law, would be to
clarify the two ambiguities that I discussed earlier: (1) the
dispositive question and (2) whether that question is one of
law or fact.
i.

The Right Question

For the purpose of deciding whether Chenery applies, the
Federal Circuit has described the relevant question as both
the determination at the agency level, as well as the potential
alternative rationale on which the Federal Circuit might
affirm the decision. As I described in Part II.D.2, when a
court declines to apply Chenery to questions of law, consistent
identification of the relevant question is crucial for protecting
congressionally delegated agency power. Without consistent
identification, a court can focus on the question that allows it
to avoid Chenery and substitute its own reasoning.
The original statements in Chenery I and Chenery II that
led to the distinction between questions of law and fact are
ambiguous as to whether the agency determination or court
alternative should be dispositive. The statements from
Chenery I, that it “would be wasteful to send a case back”
when “the appellate court concluded [a decision] should
properly be based on another ground,”283 and that “[i]f an
order is valid only as a determination of policy or judgment
which the agency alone is authorized to make and which it
has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to do
service for an administrative judgment,”284 both seem to
suggest that the court’s alternative is the relevant question.
On the other hand, the statement in Chenery II that the
court, “in dealing with a determination or judgment which an
administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must
judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds

283. Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943).
284. Id.
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invoked by the agency,”285 seems to suggest the opposite—
that the agency’s determination is the relevant question.
Whether the focus is on the agency determination or
court alternative profoundly affects the balance of power
between a court and an agency. If the dispositive question is
the agency determination, the court has much less power to
determine the outcome or reasoning of cases. Suppose, in the
context of the PTO, that the agency denies a patent
application based on an erroneous finding of fact, but the
agency could have denied the application based on a question
of law. The court would need to remand, perhaps repeatedly,
until the agency grounded its decision on a factual rationale
with which the court agreed, or until it grounded its decision
on any question of law—at which point the court could affirm
the decision on any basis. This approach may seem to waste
agency and court resources, but it preserves significant power
in the agency. It also emphasizes thorough and accurate
agency decisionmaking processes.
In contrast, if the relevant question is the alternative
supplied by the reviewing court, and the court can find an
alternative ground for affirmance that is an issue of law, then
the court can affirm without regard to Chenery, regardless of
the nature of the agency’s determination. If, however, the
only alternative ground for affirmance is an issue of fact,
Chenery restricts the court, and it must remand.286 By letting
the court choose to affirm based on an issue of law (if it can
find one), this approach gives the court more power over
whether Chenery will apply, and in turn to decide individual
cases and direct the development of the law.
In re Aoyama illustrates an example of the court’s
increased power when the relevant question is the alternative
ground for affirmance. Recall that in that case, the agency’s
rejection was based on anticipation, which is a question of
fact, but the Federal Circuit’s alternative ground for
affirmance was indefiniteness, a question of law.287 Because
285. Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
286. Presumably, under this approach, if the court did not propose any
alternative reason for affirmance but applied Chenery, that would imply that
the only alternative the court could think of was factual, and thus could not be
used.
287. See In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2011); supra text
accompanying notes 183–190.
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the court treated the alternative ground as the dispositive
question, and it was able to find a rationale for affirmance
that was a question of law, it did not have to remand the case.
Had the agency error been the dispositive question, the court
would have been required to remand under Chenery.
Similarly, In re Comiskey, where the Federal Circuit
interjected itself into the patentable subject matter debate,
suggests another way the Federal Circuit can take advantage
of the power that comes with focusing on the alternative
ground for affirmance.288 Because patentable subject matter
is an issue of law, the Federal Circuit could affirm on
patentable subject matter in any appeal without being barred
by Chenery, allowing it to develop its patentable subject
matter jurisprudence whenever it chose.
Because the relevant question for applying the law/fact
distinction has a large impact on the balance of power, the
best approach may depend on which agency’s decisions are
being reviewed, and how much power Congress has delegated
to that agency. Also crucial is to what extent the goal of
applying Chenery is to improve agency decisionmaking.
Focusing on the agency error better promotes that goal as a
general matter. For the PTO, the argument may be slightly
stronger for focusing on the court alternative rather than the
agency determination. As I have discussed above, Chenery
probably does not play a huge role in encouraging better PTO
decisionmaking, and the PTO is a relatively weak agency
with less delegated power. On the other hand, focusing on
the court solution opens the door for overly aggressive review
by the Federal Circuit. Either way, though, a first step would
be simply to consistently identify the same question as the
relevant one, regardless of whether it is the agency
determination or the court alternative.
ii. Law and Fact and the Proper Level of Generality
Even if courts were consistent in identifying the relevant
question, unpredictability in Chenery’s application would
288. In re Comiskey itself is not an example of the effect of focusing on the
alternative ground, since the PTO’s rejection there was for obviousness, also a
question of law. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2009). But the
effect would be seen in an identical case in which the PTO’s error was one of
fact.
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remain a significant problem in areas of law—like patent
law—in which law and fact are intricately interwoven. As
Part II.D.1 discussed, in many cases, whether a question
involves an issue of law or fact depends on the level of
generality with which the court frames the question. An
effective solution would likely require tackling the underlying
problem—the convoluted nesting in patent law of questions of
fact within questions of law, and of questions of law within
questions of fact. Scholars who believe there is no true
difference between law and fact other than the functional
effect of the designation289 might support an overhaul of the
doctrine such that questions identified as law and fact were
not nested within each other.290 But scholars who believe
that there is an analytical distinction between the two,291
even those who think that the current division is sometimes
“hard to reconcile,”292 “vexing,”293 or “confusing and
unhelpful,”294 might resist such an overhaul. Reformulating
289. These include Ronald Allen and Michael Pardo, who, in describing the
decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996),
suggest that “the remarkable ease with which a traditional factual question can
transmute into a legal question at the drop of a lawsuit casts further doubt on
the proposition that we are dealing here with ontologically distinct species.”
Allen & Pardo, supra note 113, at 1784; see also Gary Lawson, Proving the Law,
86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 863 (1992).
290. Even if it were overhauled to limit nesting of questions of law and fact,
as long as there were a divide somewhere, there would be ambiguities at the
dividing line. See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 229, 233 (1985) (“[L]aw and fact have a nodal quality; they are points of
rest and relative stability on a continuum of experience.”); JOHN DICKINSON,
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
55 (1927) (“They are not two mutually exclusive kinds of questions . . . .
Matters of law grow downward into roots of fact, and matters of fact reach
upward, without a break, into matters of law.”).
291. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 191, at 1042–44 (addressing the view that
there is no meaningful distinction between law and fact and arguing that while
it has some merit, in most cases either law or fact predominates; and, more
generally, discussing the important role of fact in patent law).
292. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 90, at 1064 (“But the reasons for other
exceptions [to requirements for validity being questions of law are] not entirely
clear. Judicial opinions typically state the classification of law or fact with
nothing more than a citation to a previous opinion which, in turn, merely cites
another previous opinion, and so on. Some exceptions are particularly hard to
reconcile.”).
293. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) (“The Court has
previously noted the vexing nature of the distinction between questions of fact
and questions of law.”).
294. See Lawson, supra note 289, at 862–63 (“[T]he law-fact distinction is
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the law/fact divide would have broad repercussions outside
the context of the Chenery doctrine. Any proposed changes
would need to carefully consider the effects on other areas of
patent law, and should certainly not be undertaken based on
implications for Chenery alone. Furthermore, even if it were
theoretically possible to clarify the distinction, the Federal
Circuit would likely resist doing so. Professors Benjamin and
Rai have argued that the Federal Circuit “turn[s] facts and
policy into law” in order to avoid giving deference to PTO
determinations.295 While such a reformulation might be
possible, it would be impractical to implement without other
major changes in patent law.
C. An Alternative Approach: Three Chenerys
In the preceding sections, I have shown how questions of
law and fact are so heavily intertwined in patent law that
formalistic tests for Chenery’s application that hinge on the
law/fact distinction lead to unpredictable and undesirable
results. Though one response might be to never or always
apply Chenery, both approaches are overcorrections that leave
the PTO with less or more deference than it is due.
Attempting to clarify the current rule’s application is
similarly unsatisfying.
Here, I consider an alternative
approach, and one that I believe is ultimately the most
promising. My proposal provides a more predictable method
for dividing between those appeals in which Chenery will
apply and those in which it will not. My proposal also takes
better account of when Chenery ought to apply by more
carefully considering separation of powers concerns and the
doctrine’s costs and benefits.
In considering how best to apply Chenery, it is important
to remember that fundamentally, the scope of Chenery, when
combined with the standards for judicial review, determines
the level of deference given to agency decisions. To some
extent, the Federal Circuit’s approach—applying Chenery to
issues of fact, but not issues of law, seems reasonable. It
reflects the assumption evident throughout administrative

sometimes criticized as confusing and unhelpful . . . .”).
295. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 301; see Rai, supra note 191, at 1042–
65.
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law that courts should have more power in the realm of legal
issues, while agencies should have more power in the realm of
factfinding. The foundation for such an assumption is
particularly strong for an agency like the PTO that does not
have substantive rulemaking power, and whose statutory
interpretations do not receive Chevron deference. Yet, in
areas of jurisprudence where law and fact are highly
intertwined—like patent law—the divisions between law and
fact are at best imprecise measures of how much deference an
agency’s decisions ought to receive. Therefore, I propose that
the Federal Circuit rely instead on more precise indicators to
determine whether and how Chenery should be applied.
1. Chenery Revisited
The first step in identifying more precise indicators is
recognizing that the Federal Circuit and other courts apply
Chenery in multiple types of situations. In a 1969 law review
article,296 Judge Henry Friendly examined the application of
the Chenery doctrine since its first articulation. He concluded
that when courts referred to the “Chenery doctrine,” they
were referencing what were actually three distinct bases for
remand to the agency. First, the court may remand when the
agency has not adequately explained its reasoning.297 Second,
the court may remand when the agency has relied on an
unsustainable rationale for its decision.
This was the
situation in Chenery itself.298 Third, the court may remand
when the agency has relied on “insufficient or erroneous”
determinations in supporting a rationale that would
otherwise be correct.299 Despite Judge Friendly’s article,
courts have often continued to use Chenery to refer to all
three ideas without distinguishing among them.300
Reconsidering these different uses of Chenery is the starting
place for identifying more precise indicators of when an
agency’s decisions ought to receive deference.
296. Friendly, supra note 5.
297. Id. at 206.
298. Id. at 209. Judge Friendly argued this was the only situation in which
the true Chenery doctrine applied. Id.
299. Id. at 217. Judge Friendly used the word “findings,” but because
“findings” suggests issues of fact only, here I use “determination” in an attempt
to think about issues without regard to formal designations as law or fact.
300. See Stack, supra note 4, at 964.
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Judge Friendly’s three categories of agency errors can be
thought of as varying in their breadth. The narrowest type of
error by the agency is an insufficient or erroneous
determination. The overall rationale is correct, and the
agency explains its reasoning. But either the agency has
failed to make a necessary determination, or it has made an
erroneous determination. A broader error occurs when an
agency inadequately explains its reasoning. An even broader
error occurs when the agency relies on an incorrect rationale.
Judge Friendly’s insight can also be extended to the possible
alternative reasons for affirmance by courts. That is, the
narrowest solution would be to make a corrective
determination. Slightly broader would be to reformulate the
reasoning to support the agency’s rationale. The broadest
solution would be to state an entirely new rationale.
Conceptualizing the interactions between agencies and
courts in this way, as I have illustrated in Figure 1, provides
a better framework to understand the relationship and
division of power between agencies and courts when an
agency decision is reviewed.
FIGURE 1. Types of agency errors and
solutions upon review by courts.

For an agency like the PTO where the existing doctrine
on deference suggests that Chenery should apply to some but
not all agency decisions, whether Chenery is applied should
depend on the particular situation’s position on this
framework. The more natural realm of the agency is the
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individual determination—the top level of the pyramid. The
natural realm of the court, on the other hand, is the
rationale—the bottom level of the pyramid. The middle
level—reasoning to support a rationale—lies somewhere in
between, but arguably, it is more in the realm of the
administrative agency. As a matter of institutional design, it
is desirable for agencies to explain their reasoning, not only to
ensure that they consider their decisions thoroughly, but also
to provide an adequate basis for court review on appeal.301
When cases arise in an area of jurisprudence that has a
simple division between law and fact, the top level of the
pyramid is likely to correspond to issues of fact, whereas the
bottom level is likely to correspond to issues of law. In such
an area, the application of Chenery to questions of law but not
questions of fact may be a natural division. But in an area
like patent law, with its complicated structure of law and fact,
it makes more sense to ignore formal designations of issues as
ones law or fact, and instead to apply Chenery to
determinations at the top but not to rationales at the bottom.
Under an ideal rule, the types of decisions we want to keep
within the PTO—the narrower, specific determinations on
which the agency has the most expertise—stay in the PTO,
but the Federal Circuit has more control over the broader
questions involving doctrinal development.
But an approach that simply applies Chenery to the top
two levels of the pyramid and not to the bottom is not defined
precisely enough to provide predictability. Recall from the
earlier discussion that Chenery’s application depends heavily
on whether the reviewing court identifies the relevant issue
for the law/fact characterization as the agency’s error or the
reviewing court’s solution.302 The rule governing Chenery’s
application must thus similarly consider how agency errors
are related to reviewing court solutions.
Ignoring for the moment the constraints of Chenery, a
reviewing court need not correct an agency error with a
solution of corresponding breadth—it can be fixed by a
301. Cf. Friendly, supra note 5 at 208 (describing a court’s reversal and
remand when an agency has not adequately explained its reasoning as ideally
causing the agency to “take the hint and re-think the bases of its decision,” or at
least giving the court “the benefit of an explicated decision”).
302. See supra Part II.D.2.

MOTOMURA FINAL

884

8/22/2013 3:56 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

solution of equal or greater breadth. Assume first that the
agency error is an erroneous or insufficient determination.
The reviewing court could take any of the three possible
corrective approaches.
It could make a corrective
determination; reformulate the reasoning to support the
rationale; or supply a new rationale entirely.
Assume instead that the error is an inadequate
explanation of the agency’s reasoning. Because the error was
broader than an erroneous or insufficient determination, the
court cannot affirm the decision as in the example above
simply by making a corrective determination. But the
reviewing court still has two options. It might flesh out the
reasoning to go with the particular rationale that the agency
relied upon; or it could choose and develop a new rationale.
Assume, finally, that the error is an unsustainable
rationale. In such a case, it does no good for the reviewing
court to correct an insufficient or erroneous determination, or
to provide reasoning for the agency’s rationale. The only
viable approach for the court to affirm the decision is to find a
new rationale and fully develop it.303 These ideas are
illustrated in the diagram below.
FIGURE 2. Types of agency errors, solutions upon
review by courts, and their relationships.

303. Note that fully developing a new rationale would require also
addressing the layers of the pyramid above it—providing any needed reasoning
and subsidiary determinations. Similarly, if the court provides new reasoning
for an agency-supplied rationale, that might, too, require making subsidiary
determinations.
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The slope of the arrows reflects how closely the solution
is tailored to the error. A horizontal arrow represents a
closely tailored solution. In contrast, a downward-pointing
arrow represents a less closely tailored solution. A court that
adopts a less closely tailored solution is, in a sense, overcorrecting the agency by adopting a solution that reaches
more broadly than the agency’s original error.
Whether less closely tailored solutions should be allowed
depends on the desired allocation of power between the
agency and court. Whether they are allowed depends on
whether the rule for Chenery’s application focuses on the
error by the agency or the solution by the court. If the rule
governing Chenery’s application focuses on the agency’s error,
over-correction is barred. The result is more deference to the
agency. Figure 3 depicts an approach to Chenery that focuses
on agency error. If the top two levels of the pyramid are the
domain of the agency, and the bottom is the domain of the
court, then the solid arrow indicates a permissible solution for
the court to apply to affirm the agency decision. The dashed
arrows indicate solutions blocked by Chenery, leading to
remand to the agency. As Figure 3 shows, only when the
agency error is an unsustainable rationale may the reviewing
court affirm the decision instead of remanding. If the agency
error is an insufficient or erroneous determination, or
inadequate explanation of reasoning, the reviewing court
must remand.
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FIGURE 3. Chenery’s application when the
rule relies on agency errors.

In contrast, suppose that Chenery’s application depends
on the proffered solution by the court. If the court adopts this
approach, it can engage in some degree of over-correction.
The result is that less deference is given to the agency, as
shown below in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4. Chenery’s application when the
rule relies on court solutions.
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As Figure 4 illustrates, the reviewing court has
significantly more power when the rule for applying Chenery
relies on the court’s proffered solution because the court can
always override the agency by providing a new rationale.
Neither of the Chenery rules shown in Figures 3 or 4 is
entirely satisfactory. An ideal rule would keep the top two
layers of the pyramid within the agency, yet still allow the
court to have control over the bottom layer. That means that
the Chenery rule should focus on both the error and the
solution. We want the rule to discipline an agency—and give
it a second chance—by remanding if it makes an incorrect or
erroneous determination, or if it fails to explain its reasoning.
This
approach
incentivizes
and
reinforces
better
decisionmaking at the agency level. But we also want to
prevent the reviewing court from encroaching on agency
power. The court should not be allowed to make a corrective
determination or substitute its own reasoning simply because
its solution is to provide a new rationale.
Applying this reasoning, I propose a rule that is a hybrid
of the rules illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. If the agency error
falls in the top two levels of the pyramid—either an
insufficient or erroneous determination, or an inadequate
explanation of reasoning—Chenery applies, and the reviewing
court must remand. If the agency error falls in the bottom
level of the pyramid—an unsustainable rationale—the court
need not remand if a new rationale can support affirmance
without requiring a new subsidiary determination. In other
words, if the agency has already made (most likely in another
context) all of the subsidiary determinations, if any, on which
a new rationale would rely, then Chenery would not bar a new
rationale for affirmance. If, however, the new rationale
required a subsidiary determination that ought to be
entrusted to the agency, the reviewing court would still be
required to remand to the agency.304
This proposal has parallels to the Federal Circuit’s
reasoning in In re Comiskey and In re Aoyama. Recall that
304. Under my rule, it would be permissible for the court to articulate new
reasoning to support a new rationale, as long as there was no new
determination. The court could also continue to recognize the exceptions of
harmless error, reasonable discernability, and statutorily compelled outcomes.
See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.
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those decisions suggested that Chenery might bar a reviewing
court from affirming based on a legal determination, if that
legal determination hinged on a subsidiary factual
determination that the agency had not made.305 My proposal
similarly recognizes the dependence of broader court
solutions on subsidiary determinations. However, under my
proposal, the court’s ability to provide a new rationale is
dependent on finding agency reliance on an unsustainable
reason. This stands in stark contrast to the Federal Circuit’s
approach in Comiskey. The applicant there appealed the
Board’s rejection of his claims as obvious, but the court
declined to reach the question of obviousness, instead finding
a number of the claims directed toward unpatentable subject
matter.306 Under my proposal, the Federal Circuit must first
consider the reasoning followed by the agency. Only if the
court finds fault with the agency’s reasoning may it
determine whether Chenery allows affirmance on another
basis.
This approach respects the PTO’s role as the
adjudicator of patent applications in the first instance.
Indeed, for the Federal Circuit to supply an alternative
ground for affirmance when it has not found fault with the
PTO’s decision at all, as in Comiskey, is perhaps the most
concerning of all possible outcomes from a separation of
powers standpoint.
2. Applying the Rule to Review of PTO Decisions
i.

Insufficient or Erroneous Determinations

How would this rule apply in the context of Federal
Circuit review of PTO denials of patent applications? Most of
the cases I have discussed in this Article would fall into the
category of insufficient or erroneous determinations. In re
Skvorecz,307 In re Klein,308 In re Zurko (Zurko IV),309 and In re
Aoyama310 were instances of erroneous determinations. In
those cases, the Board articulated its reasoning and based its
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

See supra notes 159–163.
In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
580 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
647 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
258 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
656 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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rejection on a rationale that was generally appropriate for
denying an application—anticipation or obviousness—but it
made an erroneous determination to support that rationale.
In both Skvorecz and Zurko, the Board incorrectly found that
an existing patent had a particular element of the applicant’s
claim, based on misevaluating the content of the prior art
patent.311 In Klein, the agency incorrectly treated the prior
art as analogous.312 In Aoyama, the agency incorrectly
construed the application’s claims.313
Under my proposal, Chenery would be applied in these
cases, leading the Federal Circuit to remand the case back to
the agency. When the agency’s insufficient or erroneous
determinations are issues of fact, my proposed rule will lead
to the same outcome as the Federal Circuit’s current rule that
Chenery applies to questions of fact but not law. But my
proposal will reach different results when the agency
determinations are issues of law. This would happen, for
instance, when they are claim constructions, as in Aoyama.
This result makes sense in light of the justifications for
Chenery. Making the correct determinations to support a
rationale, regardless of whether those determinations are
formally legal or factual, to grant or deny a patent is a
function that most clearly fits within the PTO’s delegated
authority to adjudicate patent applications. This is also an
area in which the PTO has greater expertise as compared to
the courts, so applying Chenery should result in better
decisionmaking.314
ii. Inadequate Explanations of Reasoning
In re Thrift and In re POD-NERS are harder to
categorize. Both could reasonably be classified as either
insufficient determinations, at the top of the agency error
311. Skvorecz, 580 F.3d at 1267; Zurko IV, 258 F.3d at 1385.
312. Klein, 647 F.3d at 1352.
313. Aoyama, 656 F.3d at 1297.
314. See supra text accompanying notes 220–225. Indeed, Professor Rai has
argued that claim construction, though technically an area of law, is one where
judges “would be well-advised to turn to the testimony of experts.” Rai, supra
note 194, at 881–82. Of course, applying Chenery to erroneous or inadequate
determinations of law is at odds with the current (though often criticized)
doctrine dictating de novo review of PTO determinations of law, including claim
constructions.
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pyramid, or inadequate explanations of reasoning, at the
middle level of the pyramid. Indeed, it will often be difficult
to distinguish between insufficient determinations and
inadequate explanations. But it is not necessary to parse the
distinction under my proposed rule, because cases are
remanded when the PTO’s error falls into either category.
Another example of a Board decision that would fit into
the middle layer of the pyramid can be seen in Gechter v.
Davidson.315 There, the Board held that the claims were
anticipated.316 On appeal, the Federal Circuit criticized the
Board for its insufficient analysis, which “lack[ed] the level of
for
“meaningful
appellate
specificity
necessary,”317
318
The court complained that the Board’s opinion
scrutiny.”
“lack[ed] a claim construction, ma[de] conclusory findings
relating to anticipation, and omit[ted] any analysis on several
limitations.”319 In cases like Gechter, the Board has not done
its job. But it is difficult to pinpoint whether the agency’s
error was one of fact or law. Broadly speaking, the issue in
Gechter was anticipation, which is a question of fact. But
more particularly, the Federal Circuit criticized the Board’s
opinion for lacking several specific subparts of a proper
anticipation analysis, including that the opinion lacked any
claim construction (an issue of law) and that it failed to
explain whether and how another reference contained the
claim’s limitations (an issue of fact).320
This situation does not fit well into the law/fact
dichotomy of the Federal Circuit’s current Chenery rule.
Indeed, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Gechter did not
mention the law/fact dichotomy, but merely said it was
remanding due to the lack of specificity necessary for review.
Thus, how the Federal Circuit would apply its articulated
rule is hard to predict. But under my proposed rule, the
outcome is clear: the case would be remanded to the agency.
Remanding when the court has insufficiently explained
its reasoning is consistent with several of the policy
315. Gechter v. Davidson, 116 F.3d 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1997). This case was an
appeal from an interference proceeding. Id. at 1456.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1459.
318. Id. at 1458.
319. Id. at 1460.
320. Id.
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rationales behind Chenery. Remanding when the agency has
not carried out a sufficient analysis allows the agency a
second chance to use its delegated authority to adjudicate the
patent application, which encourages better agency
decisionmaking. When a large part of the analysis remains to
be done, remand also allows that analysis to be done by
agency experts rather than more generalist Article III judges.
To be sure, I suggested earlier that Chenery may not lead to
huge improvements in the quality of PTO decisionmaking,
given that standard PTO procedure requires that that
rationales and reasoning be articulated at the time of
decisionmaking.321 But in the event that the agency has
failed to follow these procedures, Chenery’s positive effects
may be substantial.
iii. Unsustainable Rationales
Cases at the bottom level of the agency error pyramid—
when the agency relies on an unsustainable rationale—are
rare in appeals of PTO decisions. In these cases, the
rationale articulated by the agency is an inappropriate basis
for the agency’s decision, and not simply because it is
supported by an erroneous or insufficient determination.
Presumably, these types of errors in PTO decisions are rare
because the basic rationales for denying patent applications
are well established.
When the PTO denies patent
applications, it generally does so for failure to meet one of the
statutory requirements for receiving a patent: patentable
subject matter, utility, novelty, obviousness, and the
disclosure requirements.322 Denials for these reasons are
frequent and rarely venture into uncharted doctrinal
territory.323 This contrasts sharply with a situation such as
the one in Chenery itself. There, the SEC was dealing with a
newly enacted statute providing for new areas of agency
authority.324 As described by Judge Friendly, the SEC was
321. See supra Part III.A.2.
322. See 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (West 2012).
323. The Board states in its standard operating procedures that “The Board
annually issues a large number of opinions in appeals . . . . These opinions are
written primarily for the benefit of the parties to the proceedings. Most
opinions do not add significantly to the body of law.” BD. OF PATENT APPEALS &
INTERFERENCES, supra note 216, at 1.
324. Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 81 (1943).
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“venturing into terra incognita.”325 In appeals of patent
denials, terra incognita is rare.326
I have found only one instance since the Federal Circuit’s
creation in 1982 in which it discussed Chenery in the context
of this type of Board error. In that case, the court reviewed a
PTO decision to reject a reissue application.327 Reissue of a
patent can be sought “[w]henever any patent is, through
error, deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid . . . by
reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a
right to claim.”328 The applicant filed an application for
reissue, but the examiner rejected the application. The Board
affirmed on the rationale that the statutory requirements for
reissue were not met, because the applicant did not intend to
claim in his original patent the subject matter of the new
claims.329
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the Board had
misconstrued the prior case law.330 The court held that intent
to claim the subject matter of the new claims was not an
independent statutory requirement for reissue.331 The PTO
argued for an alternative rationale for affirmance—that the
application was actually an untimely attempt to reissue a
different patent with broader claims.332 The Federal Circuit
rejected the Commissioner’s argument, stating that it was a
post hoc rationalization by agency lawyers, which could not be
considered under Chenery.333

325. Friendly, supra note 5, at 209.
326. It is, of course, not nonexistent. This may be particularly true in
upcoming years with the changes in the patent system due to the America
Invents Act. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat.
284-341 (2011).
327. In re Hounsfield, 699 F.2d 1320, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
328. 35 U.S.C.A. § 251(a) (West 2012). Prior to the implementation of the
America Invents Act in 2012, and at the time of In re Hounsfield, reissue also
required the error to be “without any deceptive intention.” 35 U.S.C. § 251
(2006); 35 U.S.C § 251 (1976).
329. Hounsfield, 699 F.2d at 1321–22.
330. Id. at 1322–23.
331. Id. at 1323–24.
332. Id. at 1324. Claims can be broadened on reissue, but only within two
years of the grant of the original patent. 35 U.S.C.A. § 251(d) (West 2012).
333. Hounsfield, 699 F.2d at 1324. This case was the first in which the
Federal Circuit applied Chenery, and it was before the court suggested its more
limited view of the doctrine. See supra notes 89–98 and accompanying text.
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Under my proposal, the key factor for determining
whether Chenery applies in such a situation is that the PTO
relied on an unsustainable rationale. The PTO’s rationale
was that the applicant did not intend to claim in his original
patent the subject matter of the new claims, but the Federal
Circuit held that was not a proper basis for a rejection.
Because this case would fall into the bottom level of the
pyramid, the court could affirm based on the PTO’s new
argument, as long as it could do so without making any new
subsidiary determinations.334
Again, this outcome is consistent with Chenery’s
underlying justifications. When the agency relies on an
incorrect rationale, it is less appropriate to apply Chenery
than in the other two contexts discussed above. The PTO is
most likely to rely on an incorrect rationale when the agency
misunderstands the law, or when it is charting new doctrinal
territory. But the PTO does not have substantive rulemaking
authority—so to the extent that Chenery is “justified as an
incident of delegation,”335 its application to unsustainable
rationales may be appropriate to protect the agency’s
delegated power only when the affirmance requires a
subsidiary determination that the agency should retain the
power to make.336
Of course, the rule I have proposed here has its own
drawbacks. My proposal will not always lead to predictable
outcomes, and lawyers will often be able to argue
persuasively that a case falls into the area of the pyramid
that most supports their desired outcomes. Even Judge
Friendly admitted that it was not always clear into which of
his three categories a case would fit, and that determining
when Chenery applied was “more an art than a science.”337
334. The Federal Circuit opinion from this case does not develop the
alternative rationale for affirmance sufficiently to determine whether the court
could have affirmed without making any new subsidiary determinations.
335. Stack, supra note 4, at 1004.
336. Chenery’s application could also be appropriate in reasons related to
procedural matters, where the PTO does have rulemaking authority. Benjamin
& Rai, supra note 12, at 297–98.
337. Friendly, supra note 5, at 224 (“I am not so naïve as to think that all
cases can be neatly pigeonholed . . . .”); id. at 199–200 (“Although, when I began
my labors, I had the hope of discovering a bright shaft of light that would
furnish a sure guide to decision in every case, the grail has eluded me; indeed I
have come to doubt that it exists. Determination when to reverse and remand a
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Furthermore, it is almost certain as a practical matter
that the Federal Circuit would not independently implement
my proposal. Few cases would fall into the bottom level of the
pyramid—and even fewer of those would not require any new
subsidiary determinations—so implementing it would require
the Federal Circuit to significantly increase the deference
that it grants to the PTO. This greater deference would
involve not only applying Chenery in situations where the
Federal Circuit does not currently apply Chenery, but also no
longer applying de novo review to some agency
determinations of law—most notably many claim
constructions.
Even if my proposal does not align with current Federal
Circuit jurisprudence, it does align more closely with recent
Supreme Court opinions’ rejections of exceptionalism in
administrative law.
In Zurko III, the Supreme Court
emphasized “the importance of maintaining a uniform
approach to judicial review of administrative action.”338 More
recently in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and
Research v. United States, the Court similarly rejected a
nonuniform approach to administrative review for tax law.339
My proposal brings the Federal Circuit’s application of the
Chenery doctrine in review of patent denials closer to the
approach of most other courts in reviewing other agencies.
Although it would not require Chenery to be applied as
broadly, it would broaden its application significantly and
create a much more limited set of circumstances—
corresponding to the less expansive delegation of power to the
PTO—in which the Federal Circuit could supply its own
reasoning.

decision . . . is, I fear, perhaps more an art than a science.”).
338. Zurko III, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999).
339. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
704, 713 (2011); Kumar, supra note 5, at 233 (describing the Supreme Court’s
decision in Mayo as rejecting specialized rules of administrative law for tax
decisions, “reaffirm[ing] its position against exceptionalism in administrative
law,” and raising the “question of how long the Federal Circuit will be able to
continue flouting core principles of administrative law to promote uniformity in
patent law”).
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CONCLUSION
Though administrative law applies across many
substantive areas, scholars have noted that it is not possible
to understand the significance of its principles “apart from
the substantive responsibilities of particular agencies and the
means available to those agencies for accomplishing their
goals.”340 This is particularly true with regard to the Chenery
doctrine, which limits the options of a reviewing court by
requiring it to remand a case to the agency rather than adopt
its own reasons for affirming. The principle may initially
appear simple, but it is in fact quite complicated in
application.
In this Article, I have explored the contours of the
Chenery doctrine by focusing on the Federal Circuit’s review
of PTO decisions to deny patent applications. The Federal
Circuit, like a few other courts, has articulated the view that
Chenery applies to questions of fact, but not to questions of
law. As I have illustrated, this view leads to unpredictability
in when the court will apply Chenery. This unpredictability
leads not only to unnecessary costs for litigants and for the
agency, but it seriously threatens the balance of power
between agencies and courts. A court can exploit the
imprecision of Chenery’s scope to encroach on agency power,
the very outcome Chenery is meant to protect against. This
risk is particularly great in the Federal Circuit, which has
historically resisted giving the PTO the deference that
standard principles of administrative law would provide.
In large part, the unpredictability of Chenery’s
application reflects the deeper problem that the distinction
between law and fact, particularly in patent law, is a poor
guide for distinguishing agency decisions that deserve
deference during judicial review from those decisions that
should be in judicial hands. The application of Chenery
should instead depend on the type of error made by the
agency in reaching its decision and on what grounds the
reviewing court proposes to affirm the decision. Articulating
a clear rule of this sort would go a long way in making the
court’s approach not only more predictable, but also better
aligned with Chenery’s conceptual and policy foundations.
340. BREYER, supra note 1, at 3.

